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DeAR ReADeR,
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank attaches great importance to 
making central bank analyses on various current economic 
and financial trends of general interest available to the 
wider public. The February 2012 issue of the MNB Bulletin 
contains three topical articles, in which the authors present 
the effects of foreign exchange market participants on the 
exchange rate, give an account of the 10th Annual 
Macroeconomic Research Workshop and discuss the impact 
of indebtedness on the financial and income position of 
Hungarian households.
The article by Norbert Kiss M. and Zoltán Molnár presents 
and compares the indicators regularly used in money 
market monitoring to identify the positions of foreign 
exchange market participants, where co-movement with 
the forint exchange rate is most commonly observed. The 
exchange rate position of participants shifts as a result of 
the trading strategies described in the article, the effect of 
which is also reflected in movements in exchange rates. 
Position changes of FX market participants allowed the 
authors to derive their expectations related to fundamentals 
and hence changes in the required risk premium. The 
article documents strong co-movement with the exchange 
rate in relation to each of the indicators; and a significant 
correlation can be observed within the short-term dynamics.
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank hosted the 10th Annual 
Macroeconomic Research Workshop on 15–16 September 
2011 in Budapest. For the fourth time, the workshop was 
co-organised with the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR). The title of the workshop was Fiscal Rebalancing, 
Public Debt, and Its National and Global Implications. The 
account of the workshop proceedings, written by Katrin 
Rabitsch, focuses on the keynote speeches by two renowned 
economics professors, Eric M. Leeper (Indiana University) 
and Carlos A. Végh (University of Maryland). In addition to 
professors Leeper and Végh, a great selection of presenters 
and discussants contributed to a wide array of topics, 
including the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks, the 
size of fiscal multipliers, linkages between fiscal policy 
variables and the financial cycle, sovereign default and 
default risk premia on public debt, or the role of fiscal 
uncertainty on economic activity.
The article by Gábor Szigel and Péter Fáykiss shows that 
during the credit boom prior to 2008, substantial amounts 
of cash flowed from the banking sector to Hungarian 
households. However, with the emergence of the crisis, 
these cash flows reversed, due to a loan flow-related factor 
and an income-related factor. In terms of loan flows, 
households turned from net borrowers to net credit 
repayers. But there is a second, less often analysed 
component of the process: the volume of interest payable 
also increased as a result of the strong growth of credit in 
the pre-crisis years. This was further aggravated by the 
effect of the appreciation of the Swiss franc on franc-
denominated loans, and, to a lesser extent, by unilateral 
interest rate increases after 2008. As a consequence, the 
net interest balance of households deteriorated sharply, 
reducing both their disposable income and consumption. As 
a further novel aspect of the analysis, the authors also 
carried out an EU-wide comparison of the interest burden 
on households. This has revealed that although the ratio of 
(bank-related) household credit to GDP is relatively low in 
Hungary in comparison to other European countries, the 
related interest-to-GDP ratio is high.
The Editorial Board
Summary
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MotivAtioN
In money market monitoring, changes in the HUF/EUR 
exchange rate are considered to be one of the key 
indicators. Accordingly, all market participants concerned 
pay special attention to variables which show noticeable 
co-movement with the exchange rate. Our experience 
suggests that the so-called “quantity” indicators, 
expressing the effect of money market participants’ 
transactions and positions in the FX market, and the short-
Norbert Kiss M. and Zoltán Molnár: How do FX 
market participants affect the forint exchange 
rate?
In our analysis, we describe and compare indicators regularly used in the course of money market monitoring, identifying 
the positions of FX market participants where co-movement with the forint exchange rate is most commonly observed. 
The correlation between the exchange rate and quantity indicators may be attributed on the one hand to the fact that 
market participants’ directly unobservable exchange rate expectations are reflected in transactions and positions. On the 
other hand, these indicators are also determined by factors that are less affected by participants’ expectations, or are 
linked to one-off liquidity shocks, yet they may affect the exchange rate through demand-supply effects.
The exchange rate position of participants shifts in reaction to trading strategies described in the analysis (spot or swap 
FX conversions related to the purchase/sale of HUF-denominated instruments, taking or hedging of exchange rate exposure, 
balance of payments items, etc.), and the domestic banking sector, as a participant vis-à-vis the initiating party, must 
transfer this position to another participant if it does not wish to assume exchange rate exposure. The effect of taken up 
and transferred positions is also reflected in exchange rate changes; the degree of change is basically determined by the 
heterogeneity of expectations. Position changes of FX market participants allow us to derive their expectations related to 
fundamentals and hence changes in the expected risk premium. 
We attempt to identify changes in the risk premium in positions determined by participants’ expectations of with quantity 
indicators used in the course of money market monitoring. Among the individual sectors, it is primarily non-residents, as 
initiators of the transactions, that are the quickest to change their behaviour in response to changes in the risk perception 
of Hungary, while resident non-bank participants adjust through the intermediation of the domestic banking sector. We 
observed substantial co-movement with the exchange rate in relation to all indicators; significant correlation can be 
identified within the short-term dynamics. The reaction of the exchange rate is most sensitive to the adoption of 
speculative money market positions and least sensitive to changes in the indicator defined as the widest aggregate, which 
also includes derivative positions. The relationship between indicators and the exchange rate may change in reaction to 
shocks; instability over time and structural breaks in the relationship may provide information as to the nature and effect 
of the shocks.
On the basis of our results, the adoption of a speculative long forint money market position by non-residents in the value 
of HUF 100 billion results in a 2.89 per cent appreciation of the exchange rate. This same coefficient is 1.42 per cent in 
relation to spot transactions and 1.15 per cent for the total forint position. In addition to the above, a bidirectional 
correlation is observed in relation to the forward stock of resident corporate participants: first, changes in the forward 
stock produce a tangible effect on the exchange rate, and second, changes in the exchange rate significantly affect 
companies’ hedging activity.
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term dynamics of the exchange rate very frequently show 
a similar picture. 
The aim of the analysis is to (1) describe and compare 
indicators expressing the exchange rate exposure of FX 
market participants, where co-movement with the forint 
exchange rate is most common, (2) review theoretical 
foundations of the correlation between indicators and the 
exchange rate, and empirically examine the degree of 
correlation between the variables at various times in the 
past. 
In the analysis, we first examine the linkage that determines 
similarity between the short-term dynamics of the exchange 
rate and of the quantity indicators, then review FX market 
strategies, position taking possibilities that are most likely 
to affect the analysed indicators. Thereafter, in addition to 
the descriptive review and comparison of quantity 
indicators, we analyse the proximity and temporal 
development of their co-movement with the exchange rate.
WHiCH FACtoRS DeteRMiNe tHe 
Co-MoveMeNt oF tHe eXCHANGe 
RAte AND quANtity iNDiCAtoRS?
The effect of FX market participants’ transactions are 
expressed by the quantity variables described below. The 
basis of a correlation between quantity variables and the 
exchange rate is that the current equilibrium exchange rate 
of a foreign currency is determined by the balance between 
its demand and supply. This is not in conflict with the 
hypothesis that expectations generally play a key role in 
long-term developments in the exchange rate. Expectations 
of market participants cannot be directly observed, but a 
large proportion of FX market transactions are motivated 
by the exchange rate expectations of participants, therefore 
variables reflecting demand and supply are also 
predominantly determined by expectations relating to 
economic fundamentals. Moreover, cash flows that are less 
sensitive to interest rates and exchange rates also account 
for a substantial share of FX market transactions, thus the 
exchange rate is also shaped by demand-supply effects that 
are to a lesser extent determined by expectations (FX 
lending, balance of payments items, FDI flows, etc.).
Thus, the close correlation may be partly attributed to the 
fact that market participants’ expectations − which cannot 
otherwise be observed directly − are reflected in the 
transactions and positions, on the one hand, while the 
effects of certain demand and supply factors, to a lesser 
extent determined by expectations in the short term, are 
also reflected in the quantity indicators, on the other.
Our experience suggests that, among the sectors, the forint 
position of non-residents reacts most directly to changes in 
the risk perception of Hungary. Non-resident participants 
commonly react to an improvement in risk appetite by 
raising their forint positions, and this results in the 
strengthening of the exchange rate through higher demand. 
Analogously, diminishing risk appetite is accompanied by 
decreasing positions and a weakening of the exchange rate. 
We also observed that a considerable portion of transactions 
of resident companies (e.g. exchange rate hedging activity 
of foreign trade companies, balance of payments items, FDI 
flows, etc.) show exchange rate sensitivity, that is, the 
common causal link is reversed in this case − these items 
tend to react only to the exchange rate. Such reaction, 
however, typically impacts the exchange rate, as emerging 
forint demand may bolster the national currency and 
thereby dampen certain shocks, although this effect is 
more moderate than attributed to the role of non-residents. 
It follows from the above that the role of resident credit 
institutions as market makers is to absorb exposure arising 
from positions taken by non-residents, passing it on to other 
participants, typically to the resident corporate and 
household sectors. Beyond the indices of non-residents, in 
the resident sector the forward stock of companies 
constitutes the quantity indicator that shows significant 
co-movement with the exchange rate; changes therein are 
also absorbed by resident credit institutions.
The microstructure approach to foreign exchange rates also 
establishes a theoretical framework for the correlation 
between the exchange rate and demand-supply factors. 
According to this approach, changes in the exchange rate 
are best correlated with the so-called “order flow” 
indicator.1 The order flow constitutes the net balance of FX 
market transactions initiated by buyers and sellers, hence 
functioning as the indicator of buying or selling pressure 
weighing down on the given foreign currency. Since non-
resident participants are considered the initiating party in 
the non-resident/resident relationship,2 changes in the 
cumulated forint position of non-residents are regarded as 
the order flow; on the basis of our previous results, a 
significant correlation can be observed between the non-
resident order flow and the HUF/EUR exchange rate.3 The 
1  See Gereben et al. (2005) for details on the microstructure theory.
2  It is difficult to clearly identify the initiating party; it may change for each transaction even between the two same partners. It follows that 
identification of initiating and market maker roles is made under simplified assumptions.
3  See Gereben et al. (2006) for details on results.
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HOW DO FX MARKET PARTICIPANTS AFFECT THE FORINT EXCHANGE RATE?
microstructure theory, however, is not in conflict with 
theories, according to which the exchange rate is determined 
by expectations related thereto, as the order flow is only 
considered to be a type of intermediate link between 
expectations and the exchange rate; views of market 
participants on the equilibrium exchange rate level are first 
manifested through the indicators.
WHiCH tRADiNG StRAteGieS ARe 
MoSt liKely to AFFeCt quANtity 
iNDiCAtoRS?
Below, we briefly outline trading techniques that are most 
likely to affect forint position indicators analysed below.
1.  Spot foreign exchange conversion and buying/selling of 
HUF-denominated assets. FX buying/selling through spot 
transactions represents one of the most basic FX market 
activities. In this case, the main motivation of non-
residents is to buy HUF-denominated assets and sell 
forint liquidity resulting from the reduction of HUF-
denominated assets. (In terms of non-residents’ demand, 
government securities and central bank bills are the most 
important HUF-denominated assets; significant changes 
are seldom in their share stock, while the activity of non-
residents is typically minimal in relation to corporate 
bonds, mortgage bonds, etc.). In this case, the non-
resident participant assumes the exchange rate risk; as a 
result of the forint purchase (forint sale), the long forint 
position of non-residents increases (decreases).
2.  Purchase of HUF-denominated assets with FX swap 
financing. If the investor does not wish to assume 
exchange rate risk, it can finance the asset purchase 
with an FX swap transaction. The non-resident participant 
uses the forints acquired at the initial leg of the FX swap 
transaction to purchase the HUF-denominated assets 
(commonly government securities), while the forward leg 
of the FX swap transaction automatically hedges the 
exchange rate risk of the asset. Thus, in this case, the 
participant does not have exchange rate exposure; its 
strategy may be motivated by taking up an interest rate 
position. Although the implied yield (paid interest rate 
spread) of the FX swap transaction is offset against the 
net yield (received interest rate spread) of the purchased 
asset, the maturity of the financing FX swap transaction 
commonly varies from that of the forint instrument, 
therefore a shift in the yield curve may result in a profit/
loss resulting from the varying interest rate sensitivity on 
the assets and liabilities side. 
3.  Taking up of FX position through the parallel use of FX 
swap and spot transactions. Within a generally speculative 
strategy, the participant wishing to take up a FX position 
establishes a so-called synthetic forward position by 
applying a spot transaction and a FX swap transaction in 
the opposite direction. Where a short position is taken in 
the given foreign currency, for example, the given 
participant finances the spot market sale with a FX swap 
transaction in the opposite direction (at the initial leg), 
that is, the foreign currency borrowed through the FX 
swap is immediately sold in the spot FX market. Thus, 
there is no net cash flow on the initial leg; the total net 
FX position is assumed on the forward leg of the FX swap 
transaction, and its direction corresponds to that of the 
spot transaction. Therefore, the direction of the desired 
position is determined by the spot transaction. It is 
possible that transactions on the final demand side are 
linked to a forward position of a non-resident bank’s 
client, and the non-resident bank hedges only this 
forward transaction of the client with the above synthetic 
transaction, but it favours the combined position over a 
forward transaction in the interbank market. This is 
attributed to the fact that the spot and FX swap markets 
are significantly more liquid than the forward market, 
thus both the use of the desired strategy and the closing 
of the position are more flexible in this manner. 
4.  Conclusion of forward transaction for hedging purposes. 
Typically, resident non-bank companies are active in the 
forward market, which hedge their risk arising from 
foreign trade activities. As a common trend, the volume 
of exporting companies’ forward domestic foreign 
exchange purchase transactions increases in response to 
a weakening of the exchange rate, as they use these 
transactions with a more favourable forward exchange 
rate level to hedge their potential exchange losses 
resulting from the future recovery of the exchange rate. 
Increased hedging activity − and forward forint purchases 
− can also function as a type of automatic support for the 
national currency if exchange rate expectations in the 
resident corporate sector vary from those of other 
market participants to an appropriate degree.
+1.  “Miscellaneous”. In addition to the above, it is essential 
to note factors that cannot be regarded as trading 
strategies in a traditional sense, but may have (had) a 
role in determining quantity indicators and the exchange 
rate. One of the most important such factor in Hungary 
is (was) FX lending.4 Foreign exchange conversions 
linked to rising FX lending did not produce a pronounced 
4  Although the role of this factor has diminished substantially with the significant decline in FX lending, it has remained relevant in the long term, owing 
to normal instalments, while the one-off effect of early repayment scheme is observed for a short period, but in a concentrated form.
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impact in terms of daily exchange rate dynamics, but 
the taking up of moderate but continuous one directional 
positions on a daily basis causes a major change in 
quantity indicators. The accumulation of small changes 
on a daily basis, where the resident private sector 
assumes a substantial long forint position, plays a 
significant role in the long-term trend of the exchange 
rate. The foreign trade balance, a permanent surplus/
deficit on the current account and the rechanneling 
of government FX revenues onto the market can be 
similarly important factors, which may modify demand/
supply factors in one direction in the longer term. These 
factors or one directional trends, however, are also 
regarded as fundamentals in the long term, whose 
effects may contribute to shaping expectations.
On the basis of the trading strategies described above, the 
exchange rate position of participants shifts, and the 
resident banking sector as the participant vis-à-vis the 
initiating party must transfer this position to another 
participant, provided it does not wish to take up the 
position. The taking up and transfer of such positions also 
has an effect on changes in the exchange rate. The strength 
of the link mostly depends on the heterogeneity of 
participants’ (i.e. non-residents, resident companies and 
resident households) expectations, the degree of certain 
participants’ propensity to assume the position at the price 
of a changing exchange rate. Owing to the above, we are 
mainly attempting to identify variables that can be linked 
to the aforementioned FX market strategies and are 
capable of identifying changes in the positions of 
participants, who are typically the initiating party.
WHiCH iNDiCAtoRS CAN iDeNtiFy 
CHANGeS iN FoRiNt eXPoSuRe?
In terms of the analysis, in an ideal scenario, we would be 
able to generate quantity indicators which exclusively 
reflect positions dependent on expectations of participants, 
as these would be optimal to support the monitoring of 
changes in risk premia. Since we are unable to measure the 
exchange rate and yield sensitivity of certain transactions, 
we can approximate changes in risk tolerance, the effects 
of which bear down on positions, as well, only through 
wider aggregates. Indicators we regard as most relevant:5, 6 
A.  Long / short forint positions of non-residents aggregated 
per participant. With this indicator, we aggregate 
speculative long and short forint money market positions 
built through spot and FX swap transactions between 
non-residents and resident banks (see the Annex for 
details on the calculation of the indicator.) The cumulated 
development of the indicator shows substantial 
co-movement with the HUF/EUR exchange rate. 
  According to the strategy (3) outlined above, the non-
resident participant takes up a profitable position upon 
the strengthening of the forint exchange rate, if it buys 
the national currency and lends it on the same value 
date in the form of an FX swap transaction. Similarly, 
non-residents take up a short forint position if they 
borrow forints and sell on the same value date. The sale-
purchase is transacted in the spot FX market, while 
lending/borrowing is conducted in the FX swap market.
  The simultaneous conclusion of a spot transaction and a 
swap transaction in an opposite direction corresponds to 
a synthetic forward transaction. On the date of the 
initial leg of the swap transaction, there is no cash flow 
in a net sense, due to the opposite direction of the two 
transactions. There is cash flow, however, on the date of 
the forward leg, when the partners change back their 
foreign currencies, therefore this corresponds to a 
forward transaction (Chart 1).
  By identifying the non-resident partners, in the indicator 
we aggregate the quantity and direction of spot and 
swap transactions concluded by a given non-resident on 
a given day, i.e. the change in its spot and swap position. 
Chart 1
Cash flows of a participant taking up a long forint 
position, corresponding to a synthetic forward forint 
purchase
Forex  HUF Forex  HUF  
Spot deal  ↓ ↑ − − 
Swap deal  ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ 
Net  0  0  ↓ ↑ 
Near leg  Far leg  
5  The described quantity indicators are calculated on the basis of the daily operational FX market report of resident banks (so-called D01 report) which 
contains all transactions − of a considerable volume − of resident commercial banks in Hungary. The report contains the transaction’s deal date, value 
date, name of reporting bank, type of transaction, foreign currency bought and sold, its quantity and the type of partner (resident/non-resident, 
bank/other). These data enable the calculation of daily aggregate turnover and stock data for each type of partner. 
6  We believe that changes in the exchange rate position of the household sector is also important, but we do not have available reliable time series 
with a daily frequency in this regard.
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We aggregate changes in individual positions of each 
non-resident participant, thus these allow us to clearly 
identify the money market strategy of the given 
participant as opposed to aggregate indicators measured 
on a systemic level. Transactions concluded between 
non-residents, however, are excluded from collected 
data, as we do not have information available on these. 
This is not a disadvantage in relation to the other − next 
− indicator measuring the position of non-residents, as 
we are analysing the combined position of the total non-
resident sector. In this case, however, we measure the 
individual transactions of the given non-resident 
participants in accordance with the defined rule. Owing 
to its nature, this indicator also reveals the closest link 
to short-term developments in the risk premium.
B.  Cumulated net spot forint purchases of non-resident 
participants. The variable expresses the aggregation of 
the spot market transactions of non-residents, based 
on their direction. The indicator does not mean an 
actual stock-type measure (participants typically do 
not “keep” the acquired forints), but reveals the net 
resultant of the cumulated spot forint purchases and 
sales of non-residents from a given date. The variable 
basically reflects the effect of the two aforementioned 
strategies − (1) HUF-denominated asset purchases while 
taking up of exchange rate risk and (3) taking up of 
foreign exchange position through parallel use of FX 
swap and spot transactions. This indicator is relatively 
effective in measuring quantity effects on the exchange 
rate through non-resident participants, as non-residents 
commonly apply these two methods to open a forint 
position, and the indicator also shows the effect of 
position closings.
  Although this indicator is sufficient in itself to estimate 
the quantity effect produced on the exchange rate, for 
the understanding of underlying trends and the 
distinction of the related two possible strategies, it 
should be interpreted jointly with indicators measuring 
non-residents’ forint instruments and the net FX swap 
stock. The indicator has the disadvantage that it can also 
include cash flows related to unintended FX exposures 
(e.g. balance of payments items). In addition, it does not 
reflect the effect of transactions affecting the forint 
exposure of non-residents, but related to non-spot 
transactions (drawdown of options, settlement of 
forward transactions), although the sum of the latter 
items is not substantial in comparison to spot transactions.
C.  Total cumulated forint position of non-residents. The 
total cumulated forint position of non-residents is a 
wider category in relation to the prior indicator. This 
variable measures the effect of the following transactions:
 •  the net spot forint purchase of non-residents based 
on deal date (this covers the prior indicator);
 •  cumulated value of conversions deriving from the 
drawdown of option transactions concluded with 
non-residents (based on value date, i.e. maturity);
 •  cumulated value of conversions deriving from the 
settlement of forward transactions concluded with 
non-residents (based on value date, i.e. maturity);
 •  unexpired option transactions concluded with non-
resident participants, i.e. open option position;
 •  unexpired forward transactions concluded with non-
resident participants, i.e. open forward position;
  In terms of the forint position of non-residents, this 
indicator is regarded as a wider category than spot forint 
buying, as it also includes positions taken up on 
derivative transactions. This, however, means that 
changes in the exposure and actual cash flow may 
occasionally diverge (e.g. the period between initiation 
and exercise of options). We should add, however, that 
changes in the cumulated forint position are 
predominantly attributed to spot transactions, thus 
changes in this indicator too are mostly related to 
strategies (1) and (3), and only to a lesser extent to 
changes in the forward and option positions. 
  Similarly to cumulated spot forint purchases, this 
indicator does not mean an actual stock measure either 
(although it also includes stock data), thus it is primarily 
the direction of the indicator’s change, the underlying 
trends, and not level values, that carry information. 
Similarly to the spot forint purchases of non-residents, 
the effect of items related to the balance of payments, 
FDI flows, etc., is also reflected by this indicator. This is 
a potential problem because changes in the indicator 
may suggest a higher-than-actual FX position.7
  All of the above three indicators show the forint position 
of non-residents in some form; although they partly 
7  To illustrate this with an example, a non-resident participant converts dividend received in Hungary to foreign currency. In this case, his forint 
exposure does not change in comparison to the situation prior to dividend payment: he sold the forints received as dividend − no actual position was 
taken up. Notwithstanding the above, “one leg” of the conversion, i.e. a forint sale on the FX market, is immediately covered by the total forint 
position and spot forint position indicators of non-residents, indicating a decrease or a downsizing of the position. The “other leg” of the event, i.e. 
dividend payment, however, appears among the current balance of payments items only with significant delay, disabling comparison with these FX 
market indicators.
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contain overlapping items, they also reveal substantial 
differences (Table 1). 
D.  Forward stock of resident non-financial participants. The 
cumulated value of the unexpired forward transactions 
concluded by resident non-bank companies, i.e. their 
open forward position (total transactions cumulated 
according to the deal date, minus total expired 
transactions cumulated according to value date), 
indicates forward transactions concluded with a hedging 
purpose, that is, the application of strategy (4).
HoW DoeS tHe FoRiNt eXCHANGe 
RAte Move toGetHeR WitH tHe 
PoSitioNS oF FX MARKet 
PARtiCiPANtS? 
We analysed the co-movement of the listed forint position 
indicators with the HUF/EUR exchange rate in the period 
from 1 April 2008 to 31 January 2012.8
The long/short forint position of non-residents per 
participant, the cumulated spot position of non-residents 
and the cumulated total forint position of non-residents 
indicators show strong co-movement owing to the partial 
overlap of underlying data. Accordingly, their correlation 
with the exchange rate shows a similar picture. The 
indicators show close co-movement with the exchange rate 
during most of the period, although this relationship is also 
characterised by change and divergence at certain times, 
particularly in turbulent periods (Chart 2-5). Co-movement 
within the time series in less turbulent periods is attributable 
to the fact that non-residents’ risk sensitivity and 
expectations related to the balance exchange rate changed, 
and this determined their transactions vis-à-vis residents.9
table 1
Main properties of forint position indicators of non-residents 
A) long/short HuF money 
market position of non-
residents aggregated by market 
participants
B) Cumulated spot HuF 
purchases of non-residents
C) total cumulated HuF 
position of non-residents
Which trading strategies affect 
the indicator?
(3) Taking up of FX position 
through the parallel use of  
FX swap and spot transactions
(1) Spot foreign exchange 
conversion and buying/selling of 
HUF-denominated assets 
(3) Taking up of FX position 
through the parallel use of FX 
swap and spot transactions
(1) Spot foreign exchange 
conversion and buying/selling  
of HUF-denominated assets 
(3) Taking up of FX position 
through the parallel use of  
FX swap and spot transactions
Possible underlying causes
Opening a speculative  
(synthetic forward) position
−  Purchase /sale of  
HUF-denominated assets;
−  Taking up speculative positions;
−  Balance of payment items.
−  Purchase/sale of  
HUF-denominated assets;
−  Taking up speculative positions;
−  Balance of payment items;
Major possible contra-side items
−  HUF-denominated assets of 
non-residents;
−  Net FX-swap position of  
non-residents;
−  Balance of payments items.
−  HUF-denominated assets of 
non-residents;
−  Net FX-swap position of non-
residents;
−  Balance of payments items;
−  Opening or settlement of 
option/forward positions
8  In this chapter, in the description of the correlation between the indicators of non-residents and the exchange rate, we are moving from the direction 
of wider aggregates to narrower aggregates.
9  As noted above, instead of applying an interpretation based on strictly defined explanatory and result variables, in this case we should rather interpret 
the relationship as a co-movement. For the calculation of parameters indicating the strength of the effect, however, we need to define the direction 
of causality; this underpins regression estimation, where we explain the short term dynamics of the exchange rate with quantity indicators. We believe 
that the daily frequency of data is adequate to ensure that endogeneity resulting from bidirectional causality causes negligible distortion in regression.
Chart 2
total cumulated forint position of non-residents and 
the HuF/euR rate
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StABility oF Co-MoveMeNt 
The link between the forint position indicators and the 
exchange rate changed several times during the analysed 
period. From October 2008, all three non-resident position 
indicators took a rapid decline, which was followed by the 
exchange rate only with several weeks’ or months’ delay. 
The strength of the link also weakened during this period. 
It is possible that traders expected a stronger equilibrium 
exchange rate in this period than warranted by unusually 
intense forint sales in themselves, and such expectations 
adjusted in the direction of weakening in the first months 
of 2009 only gradually, with a delay. The trend may have 
been partly attributed to the fact that forint sales in this 
period revealed by the indicators were generated mainly by 
the sharp reduction in the stock of non-residents’ 
government securities holdings financed with spot market 
transactions; as a consequence, a substantial portion of the 
risk premium shock was reflected by rising yields in the 
government securities market and only partly and with a 
delay, by exchange rate expectations. In other words, spot 
market sales were attributed to the reduced government 
securities position and not to changes in non-residents’ 
expectations. 
At the end of 2011 and in the first days of 2012, the 
exchange rate depreciated significantly then recovered, 
accompanied by a relatively smaller change in positions. At 
that time, downgrades and communication relating to IMF/
EU negotiations jointly changed expectations of all sectors, 
thus the exchange rate may have fluctuated significantly 
even without changes in positions.
Moreover, the cumulated total forint position and spot 
position temporarily diverged upward from the exchange 
rate between the end of 2009 and 2011 H1, that is, the 
increase in positions was only accompanied by a moderate 
strengthening of the exchange rate. This in itself is regarded 
as a normal phenomenon, as the exchange rate is influenced 
by many other factors as well.
The link between the forward stock of residents and the 
exchange rate changes in two cases. Between October 
2008 and March 2009, at the peak of the pass-through of 
the international crisis, the weakening of the exchange 
rate was not followed by a rise in the forward stock that 
would have been warranted by co-movement in the past. 
Chart 3
Cumulated stock of non-residents’ forint spot 
position and the HuF/euR rate
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Chart 5
total cumulated forward position of residents and 
the HuF/euR rate
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Chart 4
Cumulated stock of non-residents’ short and long 
forint money market position per participant and the 
HuF/euR rate
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There are several possible explanations for the temporary 
change in the link. First, it is possible that bank partners 
expected lower hedgable foreign currency revenues due to 
declining export demand. It is possible that owing to 
possible losses suffered on earlier forward transactions, 
some companies made strategic decisions to reduce their 
hedging activity. Moreover, the forward transactions may 
have been limited by the volume of foreign trade activity, 
the higher volatility of the exchange rate, higher collateral 
levels raised by banks attributed to higher partner and 
market risks, and tighter price and non-price conditions. 
Declining turnover does not play a major role in this trend. 
The recovery of the exchange rate from March was again 
traced by the decrease in the forward stock. From this 
moment on, the two curves then closely moved together 
again until September 2011, when they diverged similarly 
to the end of 2008.10
eMPiRiCAl ANAlySiS
Table 2 shows a total of 10 regression equations which 
mainly cover the link between forint position indicators and 
the HUF/EUR exchange rate.
We first analysed the correlation between quantity 
indicators and the exchange rate with the following 
regression estimate:
 ΔERt = b0*ΔPMt + b1*ΔPMt−1 + b2*ΔPMt−2 + b3*ΔPMt−3 + ei (1)
where ΔERt indicates the t daily change in the EUR/HUF 
exchange rate11, ΔPMt the change in the given position 
indicator between day t−1 and t (in HUF 100 billion), while 
ΔPMt−1, ΔPMt−2 and ΔPMt−3. show the value of changes, lags 
in the given indicator 1, 2 and 3 days earlier.
table 2
Coefficients (projected to HuF 100 billion), t-statistics, adjusted R2 indicators and Granger causality test results 
of regressions*
explanatory variables b0 (t) b1 (t−1) b2 (t−2) b3 (t−3) Adjusted R²
Granger 
causality
1
Total cumulated HUF position of  
non-residents with lags
−1.45 (−15.82)
not 
significant
0.41 (4.69) 0.17 (2.09) 38.42%
yes
2
Total cumulated HUF position of  
non-residents
−1.15 (−12.04) − − − 33.06%
3
Spot HUF purchases of non-residents with 
lags
−1.57 (−15.93)
not 
significant
0.44 (4.60) 0.18 (2.10) 38.85%
yes
4 Spot HUF purchases of non-residents −1.42 (−14.77) − − − 34.31%
5
Long/short HUF position of non-residents  
with lags
−2.98 (−11.94) −0.61 (−2.48) 0.82 (4.41) 0.57 (3.04) 30.15%
yes
6 Long/short HUF position of non-residents −2.89 (−12.79) − − − 26.60%
7
Spot HUF purchases of non-residents −  
Long/short HUF position of non-residents
−1.49 (−15.84)
not 
significant
not 
significant
not 
significant
36.40% yes
8
Forward position of resident non-financial 
sector with lags
1.09 (8.20) 0.20 (2.09)
not 
significant
not 
significant
13.21%
yes. 
to both 
sides
9
Forward position of resident non-financial 
sector
1.11 (8.39) − − − 12.89%
10 Exchange rate changes with lags 0.12 (12.04) 0.05 (6.17) 0.04 (3.88)
not 
significant
16.43%
* Daily changes are explained with daily changes for the period between 1 April 2008 and 31 January 2012. In equations 1-9, the dependent variable 
is percentage change in the EUR/HUF rate, while in equation 10 changes in the forward stock of resident companies. The explanatory variables are 
co-integrated with changes in the exchange rate. The majority of equations are heteroscedastic, therefore we adjusted the t-statistics with the White 
method.
10  A closer link between the forward stock and the exchange rate seemed to have been re-established in January 2012, although this currently remains 
unclear due to the low number of observance.
11  We used the official exchange rates of the MNB. In addition to the MNB exchange rates, we also examined alternative exchange rates: the daily average 
of the average high frequency bid and ask quotations derived from the Reuters D2000 system and an alternative foreign currency basket representing 
the distribution of spot forint turnover. In this foreign currency basket, the EUR would have a weight of 79 per cent, the USD 10 and the CHF 8 per 
cent, while the role of other foreign currencies is negligible. The explanatory adequacy is considerably lower in the case of the exchange rate used 
from Reuters, while it does not show a significant difference from the MNB exchange rate in the case of the foreign currency basket. Overall, these 
specifications did not substantially modify the conclusions drawn, thus we consider the use of the central bank EUR/HUF exchange rate to be 
appropriate.
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In regressions 1, 3, 5 and 8, we interpreted the percentage 
change in the exchange rate with changes in the given daily 
position and lags on the basis of formula (1).12 In relation to 
all three indicators of non-residents, the given daily 
positions (and positions one day earlier, too, in case of 
speculative positions) show a positive correlation with 
changes in the exchange rate. Accordingly, the rising 
position is accompanied by a strengthening exchange rate, 
while positions two or three days earlier show a negative 
correlation. This implies that the exchange rate “overreacts” 
to the change in the position, and it is partially corrected 
two to three business days later. On the basis of the 
Granger causality test13, all three indicators describing the 
positions of non-residents help to forecast the exchange 
rate, but this is not the case vice versa, i.e. the correlation 
is one directional.
Interpretation of the coefficients is limited by the fact that 
all four forint position indicators are autoregressive, i.e. the 
given daily change in position in itself significantly infers 
the position of the next day.14 Since both the change in 
position and its lag significantly moves together with 
changes in the exchange rate, their effect clearly cannot be 
separated − the coefficients relating to them cannot be 
interpreted in themselves. We therefore prepared 
regressions 2, 4, 6 and 9 to measure the co-movement 
between the given daily change in position and the given 
daily change in the exchange rate, where we omitted the 
delayed explanatory variables.
Upon analysis of the b0 coefficients, we see that the 
exchange rate reacts significantly more sensitively to the 
speculative money market position than to other indicators. 
While a HUF 100 billion position increase relating to the 
cumulated forint position and spot position of non-residents 
caused a 1.15 and a 1.42 per cent strengthening of the 
exchange rate, respectively, this value is 2.89 per cent in 
relation to short/long forint money market positions. At the 
exchange rate levels measured at the end of January 2011, 
these values correspond to approximately a 3.38, a 4.18 and 
a 8.50 forint shift (Table 3). In other words, on the basis of 
correlations in the past, the 1 forint change in the exchange 
rate at the current exchange rate level is typically attributed 
to a 30, 24 and 12 HUF billion change in the total forint 
position, spot position and speculative money market 
position of non-residents.
The total forint position and spot position of non-residents 
basically carries the same information on the basis of the R2 
indicators15, and the difference is also small in relation to 
the coefficients. Changes in the position of non-residents, 
that are not related to the spot position (position changes 
related to option, forward transactions) do not contain 
substantial additional information. The 34-39 per cent R² 
indicators suggest a lower than average correlation between 
positions and the exchange rate. 
In relation to short/long forint positions, the R² indicator is 
only 27-30 per cent, thus we suffer a loss of information by 
12  For example, in relation to the coefficients of regression 1, if the cumulated forint position of non-residents increases by HUF 100 billion on a given 
day, this in itself will lead to the 1.45 per cent strengthening of the exchange rate on the same day, and a 0.41 and 0.17 per cent weakening of the 
rate two and three business days later, respectively.
13  Granger causality does not constitute genuine explanatory strength; where applied, knowledge of one variable helps to forecast the development of 
the other variable.
14  In other words, the regression equations are characterised by multi-collinearity.
15  The R² indicator shows what proportion of volatility of the dependent variable (daily percentage rate change in the exchange rate) is explained by 
explanatory variables.
table 3
effect of quantity indicators on the exchange rate with different exchange rate levels* 
explanatory variables
impact on 
exchange rate 
in per cent 
− [b0 (t)]
impact on exchange rate in nominal term (HuF)
exchange rate: 
average of full period 
(273,22 euR/HuF)
exchange rate: end of 
period 
(294,28 euR/HuF)
exchange rate: 
average of the last 
5 months 
(300,65 euR/HuF)
Total cumulated HUF position of non-residents 1.15% 3.14 HUF 3.38 HUF 3.46 HUF
Spot HUF purchases of non-residents 1.42% 3.88 HUF 4.18 HUF 4.27 HUF
Long/short HUF position of non-residents 2.89% 7.90 HUF 8.50 HUF 8.69 HUF
Spot HUF purchases of non-residents −  
Long/short HUF position of non-residents 1.49% 4.07 HUF 4.38 HUF 4.48 HUF
Forward position of resident non-financial 
sector 1.11% 3.03 HUF 3.27 HUF 3.34 HUF
* For the calculation we assumed a HUF 100 billion change in the given indicator.
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regarding only the speculative transactions from position 
changes of non-residents. Owing to the above, in equation 
7 we analysed the co-movement of the difference between 
spot positions and short/long forint money market positions 
with the exchange rate. The correlation is significant with 
a 36 per cent R² indicator, thus the co-movement of spot 
transactions linked to non-speculative positions with the 
exchange rate is also of a high level.16
Changes in the forward stock of resident companies are also 
a significant explanatory variable, albeit they show weaker 
co-movement with changes in the exchange rate (equations 
8-9). The R² indicator is low and the correlation is relatively 
weak. This can also be evidenced intuitively: demand-
supply conditions in the forward market indirectly affect 
the spot exchange rate through changes in the forward 
exchange rate, then through covered interest rate parity. 
The Granger causality test indicates a bidirectional 
correlation; the opposite direction (i.e. when the exchange 
rate is the explanatory variable and the forward position is 
the dependent variable) is stronger.
Equation 10 runs in the opposite direction, that is, it shows 
that the exchange rate change and its lags explain the 
forward position, too. The R² indicator is moderately higher 
in this case than in relation to equations 8-9. Together with 
the Granger test, this suggests that most residents only 
react to the exchange rate. Since the times series of daily 
changes in the exchange rate is not autoregressive17, we can 
interpret the coefficients separately. In case of a one per 
cent weakening of the exchange rate, on the same day 
resident companies buy HUF 12 billion with forward 
transactions, an additional HUF 5 billion on the next day 
and an additional HUF 4 billion on the day after, thereby 
bolstering the exchange rate. It seems that a significant 
number of resident corporate traders react to exchange 
rate changes with a delay. The total change in stock equals 
HUF 21 billion for three days.
We also prepared equation 11, where we placed a dummy 
variable into the above regression 10, signifying the 
turbulent periods (October 2008−March 2009, and from 
September 2011), multiplied by b0. We can thus separately 
calculate the coefficient of the given daily exchange rate 
change for turbulent and non-turbulent periods. Although 
the R² indicator did not improve significantly, the dummy 
variable is significant. In turbulent periods, resident 
companies react to a one per cent change in the exchange 
rate only with a HUF 9 billion change in stock, but with a 
HUF 13 billion change in other periods. This also confirms 
that the behaviour of resident companies changes 
significantly in turbulent periods.
The above discussion helps us in understanding why the 
split in the relation between the forward stock and the 
exchange rate (October 2008, September 2011) was 
accompanied by a rapid weakening of the exchange rate in 
the past. The depreciation may be faster and larger in 
periods when the resident forward stock is unable to 
bolster the weakening of the exchange rate.
CoNCluSioNS
On the basis of our analyses, we may draw the following 
conclusions: 
•  position changes of FX market participants allow us to 
derive expectations related to fundamentals and hence 
changes in the expected risk premium;
•  a significant correlation may be identified between 
exchange rate position indicators and the short-term 
dynamics of the exchange rate;
•  non-resident participants are first to react to a risk 
premium shock, often motivated by short-term 
speculation, while later resident non-bank participants 
commonly adjust through the intermediation of the 
resident banking sector;
•  the relationship between indicators and the exchange 
rate may change in response to shocks; instability over 
time and breaks in the relationship may provide 
information about the nature and effect of the shocks; 
•  in the money market monitoring process, different 
quantity indicators should be jointly examined and 
analysed due to their varying information content;
•  changes in non-residents’ position and their stock of forint 
assets do not constitute a closed system, hence it is more 
meaningful to focus on the dynamics of changes in stock 
than on specific levels.
ReFeReNCeS
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ANNeX: CAlCulAtioN oF tHe loNG/
SHoRt FoRiNt PoSitioN oF NoN-
ReSiDeNtS AGGReGAteD PeR 
PARtiCiPANt
A non-resident participant takes up a profitable position in 
case of the strengthening of the forint exchange rate, if it 
buys the national currency and lends it on the same value 
date in the form of an FX swap transaction. Similarly, non-
residents take up a short forint position if they borrow 
forints and sell on the same value date. The sale-purchase 
is transacted in the spot FX market, while lending/buying is 
conducted in the FX swap market.
The above method only takes into account FX swap 
transactions launched on the given trade date, but not 
maturing deals. Accordingly, the maturity of transactions 
would not play any role in this context, therefore the 
calculation should be expanded to the open FX swap stock. 
With a long forint money market position, the participant’s 
forint spot position increases and its forint FX swap position 
decreases; with a short money market position, the 
participant’s spot position decreases and its FX swap 
position increases. In relation to the spot market, the 
increased position covers a forint purchase, the decreased 
position covers a sale. In the FX swap market, the position 
reflects the net quantity of forints borrowed by the 
participant on the basis of its transactions in effect. Thus, 
the position increases if it borrows forints or its forint 
lending transaction matures, and it decreases if it lends 
forints or its forint borrowing transaction matures.
A given participant’s spot position changes by ΔSP, its swap 
position changes by ΔSW on a given value date. If 
ΔSP>0>ΔSW, this corresponds to a long forint money market 
position (the given participant buys forints in the spot 
market with foreign currency acquired in the FX swap 
market). Size of the position will be: 
min(ΔSP, −ΔSW) 
Similarly, if ΔSW>0>ΔSP, this corresponds to a short forint 
money market position (the given participant sells forints in 
the spot market acquired in the FX swap market). The value 
of the total net position will be negative:
−min(−ΔSP, ΔSW)
Spot transactions are traditionally settled as t+2, i.e. the 
date of financial settlement follows the trade date by two 
business days. By contrast, swap transactions may have a 
settlement of t, t+1 and t+2. Primarily the spot leg of the 
position affects the exchange rate, therefore, the given 
daily money market position should be compared to 
exchange rate changes linked to the trade date of the spot 
transaction. Thus, the exchange rate moves together with 
the money market position aggregated for non-resident 
participants measured two business days later.
Chart 6
Date of the financial settlement and exchange rate 
effect of the spot transaction and swap transaction
t t+1 t+2 t+2 
Spot deal  transaction financial settlement 
Swap deal  transaction transaction transaction financial settlement 
↑ 
effect on exchange rate 
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FiSCAl PoliCy AND tHe BuSiNeSS 
CyCle
Professor Carlos A. Végh dedicated his keynote speech to 
giving an overview on Fiscal Policy and the Business Cycle. 
The talk nicely reflected much of his research agenda and 
was centered around three main questions. 
However, before discussing these three questions, it seems 
necessary to define the anticyclical and procyclical fiscal 
policies. A countercyclical fiscal policy is reflected in a 
public sector that runs fiscal surpluses in economic 
expansions, but that is able to expand and stimulate the 
economy in times when the economy is performing badly. 
A procyclical policy on the other hand is characterized by 
periods of fiscal austerity when the economy is in recession, 
and by fiscal expansions at times when the economy 
experiences a boom, when they are least needed.
The first question is, why fiscal policy in the emerging 
market world is typically procyclical, while for industrialized 
economies fiscal policy is acyclical or countercyclical. Two, 
if, over the course of decades, there are countries that have 
‘graduated’, in the sense of formerly having fallen into the 
class of countries with procyclical fiscal policy but closing 
ranks with the industrialized world. And three, if and under 
what conditions fiscal policy can be an effective 
countercyclical tool?
Based on a data set that results from some prior work 
(Iletzki and Végh, 2008), and that comprises roughly 50 
countries from both the industrialized and emerging market 
world, Professor Végh provided some stylized facts on the 
cyclical behavior of fiscal policy with the business cycle. 
The strong empirical finding from this dataset is that in the 
emerging market world fiscal policy is found to be strongly 
procyclical. These findings come from inspecting two 
Katrin Rabitsch1: 10th Annual Macroeconomic 
Research Workshop at MNB: Fiscal Rebalancing, 
Public Debt, and its National and Global 
implications
On September 15-16, 2011 the annual Macroeconomics Research Workshop took place at Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest, 
celebrating its 10th year of existence, out of which it was organized jointly with the CEPR for the 4th time. The workshop's 
title and main theme was "Fiscal Rebalancing, Public Debt, and its National and Global Implications", the topicality of 
which could hardly be higher at times at which countries' excessive levels of public debt, and the deepening of a European 
debt crisis, make the headlines in newspapers around the world almost on a daily level. The keynote speakers of the event 
were professors Eric M. Leeper (Indiana University) and Carlos A. Végh (University of Maryland), two renowned academics 
and leading experts in the field. In addition a great selection of presenters and discussants contributed to a wide array of 
topics, such as the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks, the size of fiscal multipliers, linkages between fiscal policy 
variables and the financial cycle, sovereign default and default risk premia on public debt, or the role of fiscal uncertainty 
on economic activity. The workshop brought together macroeconomists from a wide background, academics and 
researchers from policy institutions alike. This meant that not only the audience benefited from a wide angle of 
perspectives, but also that the workshop was stage of quite a few of disclaimers of presenters that they are not 
representing their institutions. Finally, this year's workshop also featured a panel discussion that invited for a more policy-
oriented exchange of thoughts, on 'Debt Problems in Europe'.
In the following, this article aims to provide a summary of some of the lessons from the workshop, focusing in particular 
on reviewing the contributions by the keynote speakers and the panel discussion on debt problems in Europe.
1  Vienna University of Economics & Business Administration and Central European University. At the time of workshop MNB and CEU. The text was edited 
by Anna Naszódi (MNB).
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Chart 1a
Correlation between GDP and government spending
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different measures to evaluate and establish procyclicality 
of fiscal policy: a positive correlation of a country's 
government expenditure with its GDP, and a negative 
correlation of a tax index2 with GDP. These correlations for 
the two measures of cyclicality of fiscal policy, is nicely 
captured in the Chart 1a and 1b: it makes clear that, 
compared to industrialized countries, emerging economies 
typically reduce their spending and increase their taxes in 
bad times, and/or are not able to keep government 
expenditure low and taxes high in good times. 
Among the potential explanations for the strong finding of 
procyclical fiscal policy in the emerging world are 
imperfections in the access to international capital markets 
− with limited access to international markets an economy 
can only insure partially against the shocks it faces. As a 
consequence, in bad times it has too little resources 
available, needs to cut government expenditure or increase 
tax rates to keep the public budget in control.3 Political 
distortions in emerging economies may in addition 
contribute to the procyclicality through the presence of a 
possible ‘voracity effect’: the fact that it is hard to say no 
to pressures on the government to spend in good times (see 
Talvi and Végh, 2005). Professor Végh mentioned Argentina's 
Domingo Carvallo as an example of such voracity effect 
induced procyclicality, who in 1993, when the economy was 
in boom, publicly announced that he was reducing the tax 
rate to give back to households and companies because 
they would make better use of the money.
The good news is, however, that countries suffering from 
fiscal procyclicality have to potential to overcome their 
past, and close ranks with other industrialized economies. 
Comparing correlations of government spending with GDP 
for two subperiods, the period of 1960−1999 with the 
period of 2000−2009, allows one to classify countries into 
four different groups, represented by the four quadrants of 
Chart 2 below. About one third of the countries that 
formerly, in the period of 1960−1999, were characterized by 
a procyclical policy, have ‘graduated’ to countries with a 
non-positive correlation of government expenditure with 
GDP in the sample after 1999. The poster children of this 
group of 'recent graduates' are, e.g., Latin America's success 
stars, Chile and Brasil. There are also countries that 
formerly were displaying a non-positive comovement of 
government expenditure with GDP that had to ‘go back to 
school’, that showed signs of procyclical fiscal policy in the 
period 2000−2009 − interestingly, one such example is 
Greece.
Professor Végh then gave an overview of what determines if 
a country's fiscal policy can effectively be used as a 
countercyclical tool. In the literature, this policy effectiveness 
is typically measured in terms of fiscal multipliers, that is, 
in terms of the quantitative effect that an additional unit of 
currency of government expenditure has on GDP.4 He 
documented that the size of fiscal multipliers depends 
strongly on country characteristics such as the exchange 
rate regime, the degree of openness, the cyclical position, 
or the debt level. In particular, fiscal multipliers are 
generally found to be lower in emerging countries than in 
industrial countries. The exchange rate regime matters for 
the size of multipliers because it determines how monetary 
policy affects real rates: under flexible exchange rate 
regimes fiscal multipliers are close to zero, but they are 
positive under fixed exchange rates. Similarly, the fiscal 
multiplier is zero in very open economies, but positive in 
closed economies, it is larger in recessions than in booms, is 
zero or even negative in highly indebted countries compared 
to positive multipliers for countries with only moderate 
levels of debt. For a small open, high-debt country with 
flexible exchange rates the short run gain of fiscal stimulus 
may thus be rather small compared to the long-run pain 
inflicted. Finally, it may also be of importance what kind of 
public expenditure the fiscal multiplier captures: for the 
Chart 2
Correlation between GDP and government spending 
in the periods between 1960 and 1999, 2000 and 
2009
−1
−0,75
−0,5
−0,25
0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
−1 −0,75 −0,5 −0,25 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1
Corr(G, GDP) 2000−200
Corr(G, GDP) 1960−1999
9
      Still
 in school
Recent graduate
Back to school
Established graduate
Australia
UK
USA
Venezuela
Peru
India
Greece
 Jamaica
Chile
BotswanaBrazil
Portugal
2 The tax index used is constructed from information on the top marginal personal income taxes, top corporate income taxes and value-added taxes.
3  Some of the work in this area includes Riascos and Végh (2003) and Végh and Vuletin (2011), that focuses on normal times, or Cuadra and Sapriza 
(2010), that focuses on crisis times.
4  In addition, there typically is a distinction between impact fiscal multipliers, that measure the immediate, contemporaneous effect on GDP, and 
cumulative fiscal multipliers, aimed at capturing the output effects over a longer term.
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group of emerging markets the government investment 
multiplier typically looks very different from government 
consumption multipliers (for industrialized countries looks 
similar), namely, the former typically being higher.
In terms of policy lessons to take away, Professor Végh 
emphasized to recognize that fiscal procyclicality is a big 
macroeconomic problem in emerging markets, and that it is 
essential for fiscal authorities to be able to save in good 
times. A helpful means for emerging markets to achieve this 
objective may be the creation and implementation of fiscal 
rules, that would discipline them and would help them 
avoid the political pressure to spend in good times (voracity 
effect). Otherwise, as Professor Végh put it, it is as if 
driving a car and having one foot on the accelerator − 
expansionary fiscal policy, leading to an overheating the 
economy −, and the other foot on the brake − with tight 
monetary policy reacting to the fiscal expansion, leading to 
high interest rates cooling down the economy again.
PeRCePtioNS AND MiSPeRCePtioNS 
oF FiSCAl iNFlAtioN
In his keynote speech, Professor Eric M. Leeper started out 
to note that the current Euro sovereign debt crisis has made 
us loose perspective of the fact that the current short-run 
fiscal stress is small compared to the large long-run fiscal 
stress we are going to face. In the long run the main cause 
of the enormous fiscal stress is the rapidly aging population. 
(This problem has been elaborated on at a later point of the 
presentation.) He believes that the economics profession 
has a narrow perception of how fiscal policy affects 
aggregate demand and inflation, and that this perception is 
based on our belief that we can treat monetary and fiscal 
policy separately. While in principle, monetary policy (MP) 
and fiscal policy (FP) have just two joint objectives − 
keeping inflation and keeping debt under control − the 
separate treatment of both is manifested in the fact that, 
today, most economies have set up institutions in which 
monetary policy is characterized by an independent central 
bank that follows the clear mandate of actively controlling 
inflation. For fiscal policy no such institutions have been 
created and there are no explicit mandates. Nevertheless, 
in normal times we expect fiscal policy to set taxes and 
generate surpluses in such way as to insure that the 
economy's debt level is stable. We expect it to take as given 
the price level or inflation rate that is determined through 
monetary policy, and to passively react by adjusting 
surpluses to keep debt stable. We would call this world of 
active monetary authority, and passive fiscal policy, regime 
M. As Professor Leeper emphasized, this monetary-dominant 
regime M, is probably the scenario that macroeconomists 
are most familiar with, and corresponds to our view of how 
the world works in 'normal times'. Much of the keynote 
speech then focused on the case in which this regime M 
breaks down, and this is particularly the case in an era of 
fiscal stress − in such world, fiscal policy may not set 
surpluses to meet debt but sets them independently of it, 
thus fiscal policy may give rise to (fiscal) inflation.
Undoubtedly, we are currently facing such era of fiscal 
stress. The current recession has led to increased deficits 
and large outstanding public debts in most advanced 
economies (though not so much in emerging economies). 
But while the current situation of fiscal stress is definitely 
worrisome, this, as the keynote speaker stressed, is the 
short run. The real problem is the long run and the 
perspective of the enormous fiscal stress that our societies 
are going to face through a rapidly aging population. With 
dependency ratios5 for most countries more than doubling 
until 2050, countries are to expect huge contingent 
liabilities. According to projections by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), debt-GDP ratios will rise to ranges of 
about 300-600 per cent until 2083. While cost increases 
from social security can still be contained through 
adjustments in retirement ages, the true factor responsible 
for the high debt-GDP projections is medical spending, that 
is projected to account for about 25 per cent of annual GDP 
at the end of the projection horizon in 2083.
It should be noted that, obviously, these long-run projections 
are sole accounting exercises and simply cannot happen, as 
debt cannot grow exponentially and grow faster than the 
rate of the economy forever. So before any economy would 
reach the projected 400 per cent debt-to-GDP ratios, 
people would long have stopped buying its government 
bonds; there necessarily need to be adjustments relative to 
the assumptions on which the CBO's projections are based. 
These adjustments could take on a number of different 
forms. One, the form of substantially higher growth than we 
are currently experiencing, such that economies will grow 
out of the deficits. Two, it could be the case that 
governments will just outright default on their debts. 
Three, fiscal policy will have to adjust surpluses such as to 
stabilize debt. Four, the paths of inflation that are assumed 
in the underlying projections will turn out to be quite 
different than assumed. Or, five, some combinations of 
these. Point one, that countries simply grow out of their 
deficits appears to be an overly optimistic view. Point two, 
outright default is onerous, governments do everything to 
5 The dependency ratio captures the fraction of the population that is over 65 years relative to that aged 15 to 64.
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avoid that. Point three is probably what most central 
bankers hope for, that surpluses 'magically' arise to stabilize 
debt, where the adjective 'magically' is consciously used in 
light of the dimension of the adjustments that would be 
required to finance the contingent liabilities stemming from 
population ageing. A not unlikely scenario, so the keynote 
speaker, is therefore point four, that the paths of inflation 
will turn out to be different.
How will they turn out to be different? How might 
unresolved fiscal stress affect inflation and aggregate 
demand? And, consequently, can central banks retain 
control of inflation and aggregate demand in the face 
unresolved fiscal stress?
In this regard, Professor Leeper again mentioned the 
problem of treating monetary & fiscal policy asymmetrically 
and having put them into two separate boxes. While the 
separate treatment can be understood in terms of historical 
reasons, treating monetary and fiscal policy asymmetrically 
denies the intrinsic economic symmetry between the 
policies, in that their main joint objectives consist of 
essentially two tasks: (1) they have to determine the price 
level/ control inflation; and (2) they have to insure that the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is stable, that debt does not explode. As 
he notes, there are two different policy mixes that can 
accomplish these tasks, the one most economists are 
familiar with, which previously was labeled Regime M 
(monetary). This constitutes the ‘conventional’ assignment 
where MP targets inflation and FP targets real debt (called 
active MP/passive FP). In principle, an alternative 
assignment could, however, also deliver the two objectives, 
one in which FP controls inflation and MP maintains value 
of debt (called passive MP/active FP). This is labeled 
Regime F. While the normal state of affairs is that we 
reside in regime M, regime F can arise in an era of fiscal 
stress, when fiscal policy sets surpluses independently of 
targeting debt. In such times, the possibility that the 
economy may hit its fiscal limit6 rises. The policy mix that 
generates this, so the keynote speaker, is precisely the 
policy mix that we have seen the past 3 to 4 years. In the 
US interest rates have been (and are likely to still remain) 
close to zero for some time, while at the same time, there 
were incidents of political gridlock, fiscal policy could not 
agree on anything to generate adjust surpluses, so was not 
responding to targeting debt. Similar things can be 
observed in Europe now, where the European Central Bank 
(ECB) keeps interest rates low and at the same time we are 
not seeing all the fiscal adjustments that are required to 
be in regime M.
There are essentially two ways in which Regime F can arise 
in an era of fiscal stress: one is Sargent and Wallace (1981)’s 
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, and, two, the fiscal 
theory of the price level. Sargent and Wallace's unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic is probably the concept we are most 
familiar with, and corresponds to the common perception 
of fiscal inflation. This is the classical example from Latin 
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6  The fiscal limit is defined as the point at which, for either economic or political reasons, surpluses can no longer adjust to stabilize debt.
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America: the economy hits the fiscal limit, for some 
reason surpluses are no longer responsive to debt, the 
government then puts pressure on the central bank to run 
the printing presses and create seignorage revenues, 
which ends up producing high and volatile inflation. If we 
believe that the sole mechanism through which fiscal 
policy can affect inflation is through unpleasant arithmetic, 
then having created the (asymmetric) institutional 
structure of an independent central bank that commits to 
price stability leaves no room for inflation to bail out fiscal 
policy, then we would not need to worry about fiscal 
inflation. This is, however, as Professor Leeper puts it, a 
deeply ingrained misperception coming from the view that 
− with an inflation targeting independent central bank − 
inflation is completely insulated from FP, and stems from 
beliefs that MP reform can force FP reform.
The point is that there is indeed another channel through 
which fiscal policy can affect inflation and aggregate 
demand, and that is the second way in which regime F can 
arise, the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). What the 
FTPL plays off of is the fact that governments issue mostly 
nominal (non-indexed, local currency) bonds, which is the 
case for the largest part of government in advanced 
economies (and increasingly so in the emerging world).7 
With outstanding debt in nominal terms, an increase in the 
price level also increases the nominal backing of government 
debt, in the sense that more nominal debt can be supported 
with no change in surpluses or seigniorage. It is important 
to note that while unpleasant arithmetic is about seignorage, 
the fiscal theory is not. What happens under the fiscal 
theory in Regime F is that FP sets primary surpluses 
independently of debt, which shuts down the feedback 
from debt to fiscal instruments. This means lower current 
or future expected surpluses. MP then must choose 
compatible interest rate policy, that is, prevent interest 
payments on debt from exploding, thus revaluing nominal 
debt to align its value with expected surpluses. With the 
news of lower future expected surpluses, the value of debt 
is reduced and people then want get out of debt, shifting 
into consumption, which raises aggregate demand and 
inflation. In a fiscal theory equilibrium, it is thus FP that 
controls what is happens to the present value of inflation, 
or the (long-run) inflation rate.8
Professor Leeper provided a couple of illustrative examples 
of ways in which MP can loose control of inflation. In one 
example he explicitly introduced the idea of a fiscal limit 
and showed that in the long run inflation is determined 
fiscally. Even if the world starts in 'normal times' (that is, 
with a regime M policy of active MP/passive FP) if agents 
begin to doubt that the necessary fiscal adjustments will be 
forthcoming and believe that at future date T, the economy 
hits the fiscal limit and Regime F is adopted, then inflation 
is determined by fiscal expectations, as forward-looking 
agents bring those effects into period before the fiscal limit 
is actually hit. The long run is being pinned down by 
expectations that the economy ends up in regime F, and 
inappropriate or uncertain FP makes MP unable to anchor 
inflation expectations.
In another example, monetary policy's control of inflation 
may get undermined through risk of default on sovereign 
debt, as the expected default rate induces deviations of 
inflation from its target. Or, in yet another example, in a 
two country model of a monetary union, in which one of the 
countries sets to keep debt stable and one of the countries 
sets surpluses independent of debt, he shows that the union 
wide inflation rate is determined by the latter country. 
News about surpluses in that country will affect union-wide 
inflation and therefore the value of debt in both countries, 
which then feeds into requiring surpluses even in country 1. 
This example shows that having sovereignty over fiscal 
policies in Europe, but in any equilibrium there are 
necessarily interactions going on between what happens in 
country 1 and 2. Important to study these interactions if 
you seriously want to think about a fiscal union.
In his concluding words Professor Leeper emphasized that 
empirically it may be harder to tell at first sight if a country 
is in a fiscal-dominant world, i.e. regime F, or a monetary-
dominant, i.e. regime M, world, as it neither needs to be 
the case that regime F is necessarily combined with high 
inflation rates, nor is it the case that regime M brings about 
inflation rates are low and stable. The conventional 
perceptions of inflation miss a channel for fiscal inflation, a 
channel that channel may be become particularly important 
in times of fiscal stress. As the existing monetary-fiscal 
frameworks are largely silent on how tensions get resolved, 
which needs resolution − and therefore a lot of research in 
this area − before the big fiscal stress hits.
PANel DiSCuSSioN oF DeBt PRoBleMS 
iN euRoPe
The second day of the workshop featured a more policy 
oriented event on the workshop program, a panel discussion 
focusing on debt problems in Europe. The discussion was 
7  90 per cent of U.S. debt, 80 per cent of U.K. debt, and 95 per cent of Euro-area debt is issued in nominal (non-indexed, local currency) bonds.
8  While MP is not impotent, while it does not loose its ability to control any kind of inflation, it cannot control both actual and expected inflation, and 
looses its ability to control long run inflation. In regime F, the anchoring of expected inflation is really driven by FP, MP only determines timing.
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moderated by MNB Vice-Gouvernor Julia Kiraly, and included 
keynote speaker Eric M. Leeper (Indiana University), 
Professor Philip Lane (Trinity College Dublin), and Ludovit 
Odor (advisor to the prime minister of Slovakia) as panelists. 
The topics of the panel were Sovereign Debt Problems in 
Europe, the management of current crises as well as their 
prevention in the future. Questions addressed concerned 
the institutions − at national, international, EU and/or 
Eurozone level − that can manage the current sovereign 
debt crises and contain contagion effects. How debt crises 
can best be managed: how to design of austerity packages, 
how to best restructure debt, to allow (partial) default, 
what the trade-offs of official lending sources versus 
creating incentives for private investors are. Or, what 
institutions − either existing today or institutions that will 
have to be created − can help prevent sovereign debt crises 
in the future?
Ludovit Odor's position was that, as we stand now, all three 
pillars of the Eurozone are ruined. These pillars were set up 
as firm Euro institutions ment to avoid free-riding and moral 
hazards, and included a no-bailout clause, the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), and the independence of central banks. 
The no-bail out clause has, in crisis times, largely been 
rewritten to a no-default clause, the SGP has been seriously 
compromised several times, and the ECB, because of the 
lack of any crisis resolution mechanisms, had to several 
times deviate from its core mandate and, e.g., step in to 
purchase government bonds.
Mr. Odor sees three possible solutions to respond to the ruin 
of pillars: one, the simplest but most dangerous and least 
wanted: a break up. Two, to go back to old principles; going 
back to old principles would, however, not mean to go back 
to old pillars, but would require having to build new 
institutions. Among these would be the need of a new SGP 
with implementation of strong fiscal rules (possibly 
constitutional) and independent fiscal councils. Three, to 
embrace fiscal federalism as a long-term goal, instead of 
the current system of (big) fiscal transfers.
While working out the precise setup and features of such 
system of fiscal federalism, there are several measures 
needed in the short run. For the short run, replacing the 
current no-bail out rule, that has become incredible, with 
an more powerful version of the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and/or the creation of a European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) seems necessary, that allows 
managed default for countries whose problem clearly is not 
one of lack of liquidity but lack of solvency, and that has 
explicit exit rules. Also needed would be to allow for 
flexible use of the funds within the facility, such as the 
issue of recapitalization of the banking system.
In his opening statement Irish economist Professor Philip R. 
Lane compared the current situation in Europe to Ireland 
since it is in crisis since autumn 2007. He emphasizes the 
interplay between the banking sector (banking crisis) and 
the sovereign (current debt crisis), emphasizing that 
sovereign debt crisis becomes way more complex with a 
weak banking sector. The challenge in such situation is 
therefore how to simultaneously solve the two. The 
question of what the right analytical framework is needs 
revision and leaves much work to be done for researchers 
in the field. The search for a better framework to analyze 
these questions is also an active research area of a group of 
macroeconomists and finance professors, of which Professor 
Lane forms part, which all have different local experiences, 
and whose goal is to try to come up with new analysis and 
new sets of policy recommendations.9
Professor Lane sees an only narrow role for increased fiscal 
federalism in Europe, namely that of a common fiscal 
backing of the banking system. As it is now, the national 
banking system typically holds way too much of its national 
bonds, and is thereby too exposed to the local economy. If 
the economy experiences trouble and the fiscal deficit goes 
up, this in turn means that banks look weaker and 
experience higher exposures to loan losses. In turn, when 
banks look weaker and markets begin to question if they 
need to be bailed out, the sovereign gets downgraded, 
triggering such negative feedback loop. There could be 
several ways to improve the functioning of the European 
banking system and to break this link between the national 
banking system and the national sovereign.10 One would be 
to have diversification requirements on sovereign bonds, or 
there could be European level deposit insurance, a European 
level recapitalization fund or European level guarantees. In 
the current state, without such institution, recapitalization 
of banks largely is the job of individual countries, and such 
national recapitalization do not provide any risk sharing. 
While creating a buffer and overcapitalizing banks is one 
way to insure against large idiosyncratic shocks to the 
banking sector of an individual nation, it is a quite 
expensive option. On the other hand, while self-insurance 
(by building up a buffer) is more expensive than collective 
insurance, but with collective insurance we face large 
moral hazard problems that we don't know how to deal 
9  The group includes, other than Philip Lane, prominent academics such as Markus Brunnermeier, Ricardo Reis, Dimitri Vaianos, Marco Pagano, Luis 
Garicano, Tano Santos, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.
10  The situation in the US is different: should, e.g. the economy of Arizona be experiencing rough times, the banking system of Arizona is still backed 
by the Federal Government.
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with. So Professor Lane agrees there is increased need for 
fiscal cooperation in that narrow segment of banking (only), 
but does not see why a fiscal union should be the answer in 
general.
In addition to the required improvements on banking 
system aspects, there is a need for European institutions 
that allow sovereigns to default in a way that does not lead 
to instability, that allows being true to the no-bail policy. 
In the short run, this is needed for Greece, in the long term 
a system is needed for crisis management in the future. 
This system does not necessarily need to be a rigid rule-
based system, such as firm restructuring requirements for 
all countries when a certain debt-to-GDP ratio is reached. 
As Professor Lane stresses, it is, however, important to 
recognize that the line in the liquidity versus solvency 
debate is not always a hard line, there are episodes at 
which at a certain interest rate a sovereign may look 
insolvent but at a lower interest it would not. For some 
countries the downside scenario (the scenario of insolvency) 
can be mitigated. As an example he points to the Irish 
case: when Ireland had 130 per cent debt-to-GDP everybody 
was talking about default. After some rounds of reforms 
and recapitalization of banks this ratio now stands at about 
105 per cent, and the public opinion in Ireland is somewhat 
more relaxed. Liquidity crisis can be quite contained, the 
concept of liquidity is not a one week concept but can 
easily extend over 1 or 2 year horizons, macro-adjustments 
can take time. Banks that have long term assets, such as 
sovereign bonds or mortgages, may look better again if 
they hold on to it. If a country, such as Ireland, had to 
downsize its banking system within 90 days it may be worth 
nothing, if it were to do it over three years recovery rates 
are much higher. To insure such easier handling of providing 
liquidity over one or two year horizons, there is need for 
institutions such as the EFSF or the ESM. These institutions 
should also be able to treat individual countries differently, 
there is not one set of rules that should be applied to each 
country.
Professor Eric M. Leeper argued that as of now, it is just one 
country (Greece),  that has debt crisis, and that the term 
PIGS (or, ‘US PIGS’ if one were to include the US) lumps 
together economies that are facing very different problems: 
Ireland experienced fiscal stress as a response to a very 
severe banking crisis, Italy and Spain certainly face long-
term fiscal stress, but it is less clear why they should be 
having immediate problems, and the US has a problem that 
is due to a current dysfunctional political process, but not 
because of any threat that it may be near its fiscal limit. 
yet, financial markets do not seem to distinguish countries 
according to their country specific situations in such 
systematic way, which is reflected in high and widely 
varying credit spread implied default probabilities of these 
countries. This is, so Professor Leeper, because we 
completely lack fiscal institutions or systematic analysis of 
fiscal policy. Currently we rely on financial markets to see 
when fiscal policy is in trouble, and future fiscal actions 
often seem like a roll of a dice.
Unlike for monetary policy, our societies have failed to 
create robust fiscal infrastructures, we have given almost 
no thought at all how to coherently run fiscal policies. Being 
aware of the institutional contrast between MP and FP is 
instructive: central banks are independent (that is, not 
political), are staffed with economists, have earned 
credibility from following a clearly stated long-term 
objective, they conduct research to understand and 
optimize the long-term objectives, and they tend to 
integrate research with policy analysis.
In contrast, fiscal institutions are not independent, but are 
purely political.11 Unlike central banks fiscal agencies are 
not staffed with economists but with politicians that may 
have their own political careers objectives, they have no 
clearly stated economic objectives or rule-based behavior, 
and no research is being conducted.
Professor Leeper argued that the short run fiscal needs that 
Europe, the UK or the US are facing are very different from 
the long run fiscal needs. The real short run problem is 
unemployment, as the fiscal consequence of which means 
large deficits and rising debt. It is important to note, 
however, that to some degree this is exactly what one 
should expect when going through the biggest recession 
since the Great Depression. Optimal policy calls for 
smoothing tax rates and government investment by using 
debt as a shock absorber. It may also call for only very 
gradual adjustments of future policies to retire debt from 
its high levels. In contrast, what policy institutions are 
delivering across the Euro Area, the UK, and the US are 
large immediate cuts in expenditure and some increases in 
taxes. Fiscal consolidation coupled with fixed CB interest 
rates can raise real interest rates and could amplify the 
contractionary effects on the economy. There is a huge 
need for conducting research that forces decisionmakers to 
think about what the tradeoffs are, research that allows us 
to develop the economics to inform us about how to 
undertake these reforms. If fiscal decisionmakers are 
presented with the economic consequences (both 
macroeconomic and distributional consequences) of 
alternative resolutions to fiscal stress, this will make a 
11 In the US they are called 'bi-partisan', but this clearly is a different concept than independence.
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difference in their decisions. Such research agenda must 
include the development of formal models for monetary-
fiscal policy, that allows for features such as risky sovereign 
debt, the importance of the banking systems, the possibility 
of substantial fiscal consolidations in the short and long run, 
adoptions of fiscal rules and targets, or creation of 
independent fiscal councils. Useful work will explicitly 
model the political economy aspects of policy choices, in 
the hope of arriving at credible and enforceable policy rules 
that can be implemented and that also happen to deliver 
good economic performance.
CoNCluSioN
The workshop provided an excellent opportunity for 
macroeconomists in the area of fiscal policy to meet and 
discuss the current state of research of models with 
monetary-fiscal interactions, sovereign debt and sovereign 
risk, or questions concerning fiscal stimulus versus fiscal 
consolidation. The topics covered in the keynote speeches, 
the contributed papers of presenters, or the panel 
discussion, as well as the mix of academic and policy-
oriented elements of the workshop likely have provided 
many workshop participants with a lot of food for thought 
in the current policy debates or in future academic work.
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iNtRoDuCtioN
Our analysis consists of four parts. The first part briefly 
summarises problems caused by (over)indebtedness 
examined in the literature, and underlines the relevance of 
analysing the topic. The second chapter discusses recent 
developments in Hungarian households’ financial balance 
sheet and net interest income in connection with their 
indebtedness. In the third chapter, taking advantage of 
more detailed data, we still examine households’ balance 
sheet and net interest rate income, but limit the scope to 
assess the relationship between households and banks, 
presenting a sort of a cash flow between the banking sector 
and households. The fourth and last chapter examines the 
ratio of Hungarian household debt to GDP and disposable 
income in an EU-wide comparison, and here we also 
introduce an indicator which is less widely discussed in the 
literature: the ratio of interest payments to GDP and 
disposable income.
toPiCAl RelevANCe: WHy CAN 
iNDeBteDNeSS Be A PRoBleM?
Lending is essential for economic growth, but over-
indebtedness of economic participants may also become an 
impediment to growth. The relationship between growth 
and debt is a much discussed topic in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. The study by Reinhart-Rogoff (2010) is 
an example of the latter; it shows with simple statistical 
indicators that indebtedness above a certain level 
significantly reduces the growth prospects of a national 
economy.
The investment and growth reducing effect of over-
indebtedness was first described on a micro level in the 
often referenced theoretical article by Myers (1977) in 
relation to companies. He made the general argument that 
companies with a critically high level of debt2 invest less, as 
returns on investment are mostly paid to creditors. In other 
Gábor Szigel and Péter Fáykiss: the effect  
of indebtedness on the financial and  
income position of Hungarian households1
During the credit boom prior to 2008, a substantial quantity of cash flowed from the banking sector to Hungarian 
households. With the emergence of the crisis, however, the direction of the cash flow has reversed, due to a net lending 
related factor and an income-related factor. First, in terms of the net lending, households turned from net borrowers to 
net repayers. But there is a second, less often analysed, income-related aspect of the process: the volume of interest 
payable by households has also increased as a result of the strong growth of credit in the pre-crisis years. This was further 
aggravated by the effect of the depreciation of the forint on FX loans, and, to a lesser extent, by unilateral interest rate 
increases by banks after 2008. As a consequence, the net interest balance of households deteriorated significantly, 
reducing both their disposable income and consumption. As a further novel aspect of our analysis, we also carried out an 
EU-wide comparison of interest burden on households. This has revealed that although the ratio of (bank-related) 
household credit to GDP is relatively low in Hungary in comparison to other European countries, the related interest-to-GDP 
ratio is high.
1  The authors wish to thank Béla Simon for the compilation and availability of the household interest balance and Zsuzsa Kékesi and Regina Kiss for their 
assistance provided in connection with the financial instruments of households and their disposable incomes.
2  Specifically, companies expected to have negative shareholders' equity due to high leverage.
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words, debt − similarly to taxes − distorts the allocation of 
resources and the decisions of economic participants, 
which may negatively affect growth.3
The above model has also been applied to household 
indebtedness: Melzer (2010) proves with empirical data that 
mortgage loan debtors with a loan-to-value ratio of over 
100 per cent, i.e. with negative equity4, spend proportionally 
less on home maintenance and renewal, as the increased 
value of their property would essentially increase the 
coverage of the bank’s loan, while the net equity of the 
debtor might remain still negative. In the referenced 
research, the correlation was also valid to households with 
no liquidity constraints, i.e. to households that could have 
afforded home renewal based on their income position. 
This obviously has a negative effect on household (home) 
investments, real estate prices and economic growth as 
well. Although our recent paper does not explore this 
mechanism in detail for Hungary (moreover, comparison of 
US data used by Melzer with Hungarian data should be 
treated with caution, due to different legal-institutional 
environments5), we should note that this balance sheet 
structure related problem may also be relevant in Hungary. 
Due to the weakening of the forint exchange rate, namely, 
the amount of the loan has grown above the value of 
properties serving as collateral in the case of a substantial 
portion of FX mortgage loans (at least for 25 per cent of 
loans)6, and the average LTV ratios have increased 
significantly. In parallel with the above (see Annex, Chart i), 
(home) investment by households also declined in recent 
years (although this is clearly not attributable exclusively to 
the high LTV ratios, but also to income trends and stalled 
lending).
Beyond the distorting effect on (home) investment, the 
over-indebtedness of households also negatively affects 
growth prospects through another channel, at least in the 
short run. In essence, this means that the direction of cash 
flows between households and their lenders is suddenly 
reversed in the period following the credit boom: households 
become net credit repayers from net credit borrowers, and 
this suddenly and temporarily reduces the income of 
households disposable for consumption. In periods of 
recession, this may further aggravate the decline in 
consumption and increase the time required for the 
recovery of consumption. The empirical analysis by Olney 
(1999) shows that the record level of consumer loans 
borrowed by US households significantly contributed to the 
collapse of consumption during the major global economic 
crisis. Mian et al. (2011) applies micro data from the current 
US debt crisis to show that consumption declined at a faster 
rate in regions where household indebtedness was higher. 
An analysis prepared by the Dutch central bank (van Els et 
al., 2005) provides an example where not only the reversal 
of a credit boom, but also its temporary slowdown may 
cause a decline in consumption and an economic downturn.
In relation to Hungary, studies published so far on the 
indebtedness of households have predominantly focused on 
determining whether the rate and dynamics of household 
borrowing before the crisis was at an equilibrium or 
excessive level. The study by Kiss et al. (2006) did not 
perceive a higher than equilibrium level of household 
indebtedness up to 2005. Using the same methodology and 
more recent data, however, we identified signs of excessive 
indebtedness from 2006 (see Annex, Chart ii), although this 
methodology is not appropriate for doubtless identification. 
In another study (Brown and Lane, 2011) prepared by the 
World Bank, analysing the level of indebtedness in emerging 
European countries on the basis of GDP-proportionate 
credit stock data, the conclusion is drawn that the 
Hungarian household sector, similarly to sectors in other 
countries in the region, does not show excessive 
indebtedness. This study, however, only analysed stock data 
and not the interest burden, and it disregarded further 
substantial growth in the volume of FX loans since 2009 due 
to the exchange rate effect. The draft analysis by Endrész 
and Virág (2012) takes into account this latter effect as well 
and observes a high level of indebtedness of Hungarian 
households and its negative effects on consumption.
BAlANCe SHeet ADjuStMeNtS  
AND Net iNteReSt iNCoMe oF 
HouSeHolDS BeFoRe AND AFteR tHe 
CReDit BooM
In this chapter, we review the two impact channels of 
indebtedness affecting household income and consumption: 
balance sheet changes and the net interest income channel.
3  For a more detailed summary of related literature, see Brown and Lane (2011).
4  In relation to household mortgage loans, negative equity means that the value of the property (asset) owned by the households, serving as collateral 
for the loan, is smaller than that of the household loan (funds), therefore the “net asset” of the debtor is negative.
5  As a main difference, in many states of the United States, debtors are not liable for the value of the mortgage loan in excess of the value of the 
property collateral, thus they are not obliged to repay their outstanding mortgage loan debt following the sale of the property, while debtors in 
Hungary are obliged to do so. However, Melzer’s results suggest that debtors with negative equity reduced their home investments by a similar rate 
in US states, where they were also liable for debt in excess of the value of the property. The behaviour of debtors living in different legal environments, 
however, did vary in relation to their propensity to repay loans.
6  This estimate derives from the database of the MNB Bank Panel, based on data measured in the summer of 2010 (with a 210 HUF/CHF exchange rate).
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The trends affecting the balance sheet of the resident 
household sector are summarised in Chart 1. From 1995 
until the early 2000s, households generally saved; borrowing 
was not widespread. There were two waves of borrowing 
witnessed in the 2000s: the rise in subsidised forint loans in 
the first half of the decade and FX mortgage loans between 
2005 and 2008. As a result, the consumption rate of 
households increased significantly, while their investment 
rate rose at a more moderate level. Thus, by definition, the 
gross savings rate could not increase and the net savings 
rate fell to approximately zero.
The emergence of the crisis at the end of 2008 − declining 
credit demand caused by uncertainty and tightening bank 
credit standards − put an end to the credit boom, and the 
net saving rate of households slowly recovered to pre-2001 
levels. Due to the cumulated credit stock, however, this 
was accompanied by a lower gross saving rate and negative 
credit flow (net credit repayment). Adjustment was 
observed in the consumption rate and more strongly in the 
investment rate (although this was also attributed to a 
decrease in real income).
Improving net savings, however, were significantly offset by 
the revaluation of net financial assets in 2010 and 2011.7 
This is principally attributed to the revaluation of FX loans 
caused by the appreciating Swiss franc. The revaluation 
exceeded net debt repayment in both 2010 and 2011. Thus, 
overall, household debt denominated in forints increased, 
notwithstanding that in the meantime households became 
net repayers. If we take into account this revaluation effect 
as well, this “adjusted net saving rate” was even lower in 
the past two years than during the credit boom in 2006 and 
2007 (when the revaluation of households’ financial assets 
− mainly that of their equity shares − was positive). In other 
words, the growth of total net financial assets of households 
denominated in forints was even more subdued than during 
the credit boom.
The above data, however, only reveal changes in the 
balance sheet of households (balance sheet channel), i.e. 
the effects of loan flows. These do not take into account Chart 1
Changes in the financial instruments and liabilities of 
households (not including private pension fund 
assets) adjusted for exchange rate changes and 
revaluation of net financial assets relative to GDP, 
and investment and consumption rate
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Note: Change in financial assets and liabilities, difference between the 
two and revaluation effect relative to GDP; the consumption and 
investment rate is based on disposable income.
Source: MNB, financial accounts (consolidated).
Chart 2
interest income-to-GDP ratio, interest expenditures 
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Interest income
Interest expenditures 
Difference (interest balance)
Per cent Per cent
Note: The following items are settled among household interest income: 
interest on deposits (including interest tax), interest on debt securities 
(e.g. government securities, bank or corporate bonds), all non-exchange 
gain and revaluation yields from investment units, dividend from share 
investments. Interest expenditures of households include interest and 
similar expenditures payable on loans drawn from banks and other 
participants (financial enterprises, companies, non-residents) (including 
interest expenditures financed by the government). The data are 
estimates.
Source: MNB Statistics.
7  Although the chart only indicates data relating to the first three quarters of 2011, and net repayment sharply increased in the last three months of 
the year as a result of the preferential total repayment programme, the revaluation effect is still in proportion to net repayment.
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that the volume of interest payable on the credit stock also 
rose (income channel), first, because of the credit boom 
and the increasing loan volume itself and, later, because of 
the impact of the weakening forint exchange rate on FX 
loans. This reduces the disposable income of households, 
which produces a further negative effect on consumption, 
in addition to the balance sheet adjustment and the 
resulting decline in the consumption rate.8
The difference between interest received and paid (interest 
balance) by households has indeed increased significantly: 
at a gradual and slower rate during the credit boom and 
suddenly, at a faster rate after the emergence of the crisis. 
As indicated by Chart 2, at the end of 2010 the interest 
balance of households was negative, exceeding 1.4% of GDP, 
in comparison to the approximately 0 value before the 
crisis. If projected to disposable income, this net interest 
balance of households equalled −2.2 per cent in 2010 (in 
comparison: real wages decreased by approximately 3 per 
cent in the crisis year 2009). On the basis of preliminary 
data and bank statistics presented in the next chapter, we 
may assume that the trend has not reversed in 2011 either. 
We should add that although the financial income balance 
of households stated in this study is not complete, we 
assume that it effectively shows the income dynamics 
(decline) at work.9
The decline in net interest balance is primarily attributed 
to the steady increase in interest expenditures caused by 
the credit boom, while the interest income of households 
shows non-trend related fluctuation. The latter is 
attributable to the fact that household interest income was 
generally determined by the current interest environment, 
although the ratio of the interest bearing stock to GDP also 
increased at a gradual rate10. For example, the significant 
central bank interest rate increases in the autumn of 2003 
and 2008 temporarily increased the interest income (and 
hence income) of households, but their effect gradually 
ceased with the beginning of the interest rate easing cycle. 
Chart 2 clearly shows that the interest rate increase at the 
end of 2008 and strong deposit competition among banks 
thereafter temporarily and significantly increased the 
volume of interest received by households, which 
temporarily delayed the deterioration in the interest 
balance.
The rate of interest paid by households, however, was 
predominantly determined by the credit boom, affected by 
the flow of credit until 2008 and thereafter by the 
revaluation of FX loans attributed to the depreciation of the 
forint exchange rate. From 2001 to September 2011, the 
household credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 10.7 per cent 
to 40.6 per cent in Hungary, thus the ratio of interest 
expenditures of households to GDP rose from 1 per cent to 
over 3 per cent over the period. In parallel, the average 
interest rate even decreased over the year 2001, that is, the 
increase in the volume of payable interest is clearly 
attributable to the growing credit stock.11 
In conclusion, indebtedness before the crisis caused a shock 
to the income and consumption of households through two 
channels. First, the direction of cash flows reversed, and 
households became net credit repayers from net borrowers, 
and, second, more interest is obviously payable on a credit 
stock that expanded in previous years to exceed its amount 
at the beginning of the decade. Interest received on 
financial savings could not offset this increasing interest 
burden either, essentially because the rise in the volume of 
household financial instruments could not adjust to the 
dynamic rise in the credit stock.12
8  Disposable income in the national accounts is income available for consumption after production and income distribution. Net borrowing enables 
households to temporarily consume more than their disposable income (consumption rate > 100 per cent). In consequence, households will eventually 
need to effect “compulsory savings” of sorts to make net repayments, which reduces the rate of consumption from income at a given level. The 
balance of paid and received interest, however, reduces (disposable) income itself, and thereby affects consumption. We should note, however, that 
a portion of household net interest payments is part of consumption, as financial services (FISIM) related thereto, measured indirectly, are included 
in consumption. In other words, some changes in interest rates do not modify consumption, but only increase or decrease the weight of bank financial 
services within consumption to the disadvantage of other sectors’ products.
9  The stated interest balance completely covers the financial liabilities of households, but not their financial savings. This is attributable to the fact 
that interest received does not include household income originating from insurance technical reserves and participations. Thus, the income balance 
of households realised on total financial assets may actually be moderately higher than shown in Chart 2. Since, however, the financial savings of 
households did not undergo substantial restructuring in the past ten years, save for changes in the private pension fund scheme which our calculations 
have disregarded, the dynamics presented here presumably effectively indicate changes in the total financial income of households.
10  The interest bearing financial instruments of households − bank deposits, bonds, loans provided, portion of investment units invested in interest 
bearing instruments − showed slow but continuous growth (rising from 35.5 per cent in 2001 to 44.5 per cent in September 2011). These data do not 
include private pension fund savings.
11   Interest payable by households also includes interest subsidies on government subsidised mortgage loans. Since the ratio of such loans was higher in 
the volume of payable interest in the early 2000s, interest actually payable by households grew less in the early 2000s than shown in Chart 2. FX 
loans, however, are not linked to government interest subsidies, thus the effect of this factor diminished over time.
12   As regards the latter, we should note that even if the GDP-proportionate volume of received interest would have increased, the negative effect on 
consumption resulting from the heterogeneity of households (deposit interest is received and interest is paid on loans not by the same households) 
would have been present in some degree. See Mankiw (2000) for details regarding the heterogeneity of deposit holders and borrowers.
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BAlANCe SHeet ADjuStMeNt  
AND iNCoMe eFFeCtS iN tHe 
RelAtioNSHiP BetWeeN HouSeHolDS 
AND tHe BANKiNG SeCtoR
The previous chapter examined the effect of indebtedness 
on the balance sheet position and net interest income on 
the basis of a wider range of financial statistics on 
households. In the following section, we will only analyse 
the relationship of households and credit institutions (not 
including the co-operative sector), practically establishing a 
cash flow − relating to credit and debit transactions − 
between the two sectors. This has the advantage that more 
detailed data available from 2006 enable further analysis 
and comparison on an international scale (see next section). 
In this chapter, we state cash flow values in HUF billions, so 
that GDP dynamics do not distort the indicators; but the 
Annex also contains charts projected to the nominal GDP 
and the disposable income of households.
Chart 3 shows cash flows related to credit side transactions 
between banks and households. It reveals trends similar to 
those described in the previous chapter: the robust credit 
boom before the crisis is stalled in 2009 and turned into net 
repayment from 2010. Interest payments of households to 
banks basically doubled between 2006 and 2009, followed 
by a very moderate decrease in 2010 and 2011.13 The chart 
also shows that since the crisis, the role of interest payment 
has been significantly larger than that of stock on the credit 
side in cash flows between households and the banking 
sector, although the decline in net stock also picked up at 
the end of 2011 due to the preferential total repayment 
option. Overall, the marked change of direction of cash 
flows on the credit side is also revealed: the difference 
between annual cash flows on the credit side before and 
after the crisis well exceeded HUF 1,000 billion (4 per cent 
of GDP, 7 per cent of disposable income) − even before the 
preferential early repayment scheme of the Hungarian 
Government (launched in September 2012). Notwithstanding 
the above, the bank debt of households even increased as 
a result of the revaluation of FX loans − in 2010, at a level 
approximating the credit boom in the 2006−2008 period.
Since the weight of interest flow between households and 
banks has increased, we also prepared an estimate of the 
underlying factors, as indicated by Chart 4. Using MNB 
interest rate and other banking statistics, we distinguished 
the following effects of changes in interest payment 
volume. It is important to emphasise that the following 
results are estimates that effectively show the magnitude 
and direction of changes, but are not accurate accounting 
statements, therefore, they should be interpreted with 
caution14:
•  Volume and composition effect: we treated these jointly 
for technical reasons. In general terms, the volume effect 
means that with constant credit interest and exchange 
rates the interest volume payable by households ceteris 
paribus automatically increases with the rise in household 
credit stock. This effect generally explains the rise in 
Chart 3
Cash flows between households and the banking 
sector (not incl. the co-operative sector) related to 
household credit transactions 
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We drew data on household interest payments on bank loans from bank 
profit and loss accounts, therefore, these contain actual interest 
payment figures (not including, for example, unpaid interest on non-
performing loans). The above data relate to the banking sector exclusive 
of the co-operative sector.
Source: MNB.
13  See Annex for version of Chart 3 relative to the GDP and disposable income.
14  We estimated the volume of interest paid by households by multiplying average customer interest set for various credit types in the interest statistics 
of the MNB with the related stock of outstanding credit. Thus, the effect resulting from changes in average customer interest can be easily estimated 
for the volume of paid interest, and the amount of payable interest relating to FX loans could be calculated even with different exchange rate levels. 
We approached the portfolio effect by assuming that customers will not fulfil their interest payment obligations overdue more than 90 days and 
customers with obligations overdue within 90 days will fully effect interest payment. Interest income estimated from interest statistics effectively 
approximates household interest income stated in bank profit and loss accounts, although the difference between the two may become substantial 
in certain periods, as shown by Chart 4. This is attributed, among others, to our inability to accurately identify the effect of non-performing debtors, 
interest income from revolving loans and bank fees charged on principal, not included in interest statistics, in estimation from interest statistics.
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credit interest paid by households up to the end of 2009, 
sustained by the credit boom’s effect on 12-month rolled-
over data. The volume effect has since become minimal. 
With the composition effect, the weight of certain credit 
products increases, while that of others decreases. Until 
2008, when the weight of the relatively cheaper Swiss 
franc loans increased within household loans, this effect 
generally reduced the interest payment volume. After 
2008, however, the weight of Swiss franc loans decreased 
somewhat against more expensive euro loans, generating 
a moderate increase in the interest burden (the weight of 
forint loans, dominating new disbursements, within the 
credit stock has basically remained unchanged since 2008 
due to the nominal increase of FX loans caused by the 
weaker forint exchange rate);
•  Exchange rate effect: due to the weakening of the forint 
since 2008, the stock of FX loans has been revalued, thus 
the value of interest payment calculated on the basis of 
stock, denominated in forints, has also increased. This 
effect does not affect forint loans, but due to the weaker 
HUF rate, in 2011 (average exchange rates: 277 HUF/EUR, 
224 HUF/CHF) households paid approximately HUF 80 
billion more on interest than they would have paid at 
exchange rates before 2008 in relation to Swiss franc and 
euro loans;15
•  Interest rate effect: the volume of interest payable 
depends on the nominal credit interest rate. Since the 
emergence of the crisis, only interest rates on forint 
denominated mortgage loans have decreased among the 
various types of products, while interest rates on FX loans 
and uncovered forint loans have increased. As a result of 
the interest rate effects, in 2011 debtors paid HUF 45 
billion more than in 2008. We discussed the reasons for 
interest rate increases by banks in the MNB (2010) 
publication; we drew the conclusion that the interest rate 
hikes were not fully supported by the rise in financing 
costs and credit losses in relation to Swiss franc mortgage 
loans. The increase in the country risk premium in 2011 
H2, proving to be protracted, changed our view in this 
regard, as the persistence of current risk premia may also 
significantly raise the funding costs of banks, which would 
not rule out the necessity of further interest rate 
increases in relation to Swiss franc loans (see Annex, 
Chart vii);
•  Portfolio deterioration effect: non-performing debtors 
obviously do not pay interest either. Due but unpaid 
interest does not have a cash flow effect or appear in 
banks’ financial statements. The ratio of non-performing 
debtors increased from 1.5 per cent at the end of 2008 to 
over 11 per cent, reducing interest payments from 
households to banks by a total of HUF 90 billion;
•  Other effects: combined effect of the above partial 
factors (+HUF 10 billion over the year 2008).
In conclusion, bank interest expenditures of households 
basically increased in parallel with the rise in credit stock 
until the end of 2008. Thereafter, however, the rising 
volume of interest paid was increasingly attributable to the 
weakening of the forint and interest rate hikes implemented 
by banks; according to our estimates, this amounted to a 
total value of approximately HUF 120-130 billion. This fully 
Chart 4
Decomposition of bank credit interest paid by 
households based on estimates prepared from MNB 
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Note: Footnote 14 contains the background to the calculations. It is 
important to emphasise that the decomposed interest payment volume 
is an estimate which − shown in the chart − varies from actual 
household interest payment data drawn from bank profit and loss 
accounts. Therefore, the data shown are not accurate, but well reflect 
the main trends. The above data relate to the banking sector exclusive 
of the co-operative sector.
Source: Estimate by the authors based on MNB interest statistics.
15  This increase may seem small in comparison to the annual interest payment volume of roughly HUF 600-700 billion, considering that the strengthening 
of the Swiss franc against the forint amounted to 40 per cent at the average exchange rate in 2011 over levels measured before the crisis. In fact, 
approximately half of credit interest paid by households is linked to forint loans: although the FX loans account for over 70 per cent of the credit 
stock, interest on forint loans is higher, particularly in relation to consumer loans.
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encumbered still performing debtors. Actual aggregate 
interest payments by households, however, did not increase 
at such a rate, as the volume of interest not paid by non-
performing debtors also rose sharply. At first glance, this 
would imply that portfolio deterioration dampened the 
income reducing effect of household interest payments. 
However, if we assume that the income of non-performing 
debtors declined in any case during the crisis, there was no 
such dampening effect at work16; the increase in interest 
payments attributed to the rising exchange rate and interest 
rates fully decreased the disposable income of households. 
This amounts to 0.7-0.8 per cent of disposable income, 
approximately 0.8-0.9 per cent of consumption, based on 
the above additional interest expenditures of HUF 120-130 
billion annually.
Analysis of the debit side, however, is much more difficult 
and shows a different picture than the one emerging in the 
previous chapter. This is attributable to the fact that while 
the majority of household loans are bank loans, only a 
smaller portion of household savings are bank deposits. 
Moreover, households reorganise relatively frequently their 
portfolios between different forms of savings (stock 
movement is particularly common between investment 
units and bank deposits). In addition, the market share of 
the credit union sector − disregarded in our analysis − on 
the debit side is also much higher than that of loans. All 
these factors distort the change in the stock of net bank 
deposits of households in Chart 5; in 2006 and 2010, for 
example, a significant amount of deposits flowed into 
investment units (net deposits are therefore at a relatively 
low level), while this was reversed at the end of 2008. 
Income trends, however, are well reflected by this 
16 Moreover, “income smoothing” aggregated in this manner is obviously unsustainable and negatively affects financial stability.
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Source: MNB.
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calculation: the 300 basis point interest rate increase by the 
central bank at the end of 2008 and intensifying deposit 
competition among banks emerging in early 2009 increased 
household interest income substantially in 2009 (this was 
less attributable to new deposits flowing in at the end of 
2008).
Chart 6 shows the comparison of debit and credit side cash 
flows (Chart 3 and 5) between households and the banking 
sector.17 We can observe that cash flows between households 
and banks was generally determined by the change in net 
stock on the credit side: before the crisis, on the credit side 
cash flows from banks to households, which was reversed 
with credit repayments. The interest balance of households 
also significantly deteriorated as a combined result of the 
credit boom, the depreciation of the forint exchange rate 
and rising credit interest rates since 2008 − in line with the 
results presented in the previous chapter. (The negative 
interest balance comes as no surprise, as the interest 
balance of households vis-à-vis banks is typically negative in 
other European countries as well).
iNDeBteDNeSS AND iNteReSt BuRDeN 
oF HuNGARiAN HouSeHolDS iN 
iNteRNAtioNAl CoMPARiSoN
The literature18 on the debt overhang of households generally 
focuses on stock data. On the basis of these literature data/
reviews, the indebtedness of Hungarian households does not 
seem high in international comparison. In the previous 
chapters, however, we observed that rising debt may have a 
negative effect on household income (and hence on 
consumption) through a higher interest burden as well, and if 
we also take into account the volume of interest paid by 
households, domestic household indebtedness thus measured 
does not at all seem low in international comparison.
To produce the estimate shown below, we used interest 
statistics and credit stock data accessible on the websites 
of the ECB and central banks. Before we discuss the results, 
we should briefly describe the applied methodology. Below, 
we focus only on household loans within the banking sector, 
as comparable data are available in relation to these. This 
allows us to effectively cover the credit side of households, 
as household lending is commonly conducted through the 
banking sector in Europe; other financial intermediaries 
play a small role (Annex, Chart viii), albeit a somewhat 
larger one in Hungary. Several other factors, however, limit 
the international comparison of interest burdens. First, 
interest statistics are not comprehensive in scope or fully 
harmonised, and, second, costs similar to interest but not 
termed as interest are generally not covered by interest 
statistics (e.g. principal-proportionate bank fees which are 
frequent in Hungary in relation to mortgage loans). 
Furthermore, when using interest statistics, we are unable 
to take into account the effect of non-performing loans 
either, although we observed in the previous chapter that 
this is a major distorting item in national data. Due to the 
above reason and other distorting effects, estimates stated 
here in relation to Hungary are not in full harmony with the 
previous chapter. In view of these estimation related 
problems, it is important to emphasise that the comparison 
below should be interpreted with caution.
International comparison indicates that the estimated bank 
credit interest burden of Hungarian households as a 
proportion of GDP is among the highest in Europe (Chart 7). 
In 2011, the ratio of interest payments by Hungarian 
households to GDP was broadly at the same level as in 
countries with over twice as large household indebtedness 
as a proportion of GDP as that of Hungary. The interest 
payments-to-GDP ratio in Hungary is also higher in 
comparison with the Central Eastern European region (the 
possible causes are discussed in greater detail below.)
17 The version of Chart 6 showing data relative to the GDP and disposable income is also contained in the Annex.
18 For example, Brown and Lane (2011) and Kiss et al. (2006) referenced above, and Hudecz et al. (2012).
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Note: the 2011 GDP figure is the current forecast available through 
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statistics (with 12 month rolled-over data for 2011, between December 
2010 and November 2011). Due to the different methodology (effect of 
non-performing loans, consideration of co-operative credit institutions, 
etc.), the national interest burden shown here is roughly similar to, but 
not an exact match of data shown in the previous chapter.
Source: Web sites of ECB, MNB, Eurostat, various central banks.
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Analysing the dynamics of the indebtedness and interest 
burdens of households before and after the crisis, we may 
observe that although the credit stock of households as a 
proportion of GDP- did not decline in most European 
countries and even increased in some regional countries 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland), the ratio of interest 
payments by households to GDP decreased (Chart 8). This 
may be attributable to the downward effect on financing 
costs of central bank interest rate cuts implemented during 
the crisis. This in turn may have reflected the continuing 
rise in lending in countries where the interest burden as a 
proportion of GDP increased (Czech Republic, Slovakia), 
while the proportionate increase of the interest burden in 
Greece is linked to the sharp decline in nominal GDP. 
Hungary is the only country where the interest burden of 
households as a proportion of GDP increased without either 
a credit boom or a sharp fall in nominal GDP, for reasons 
discussed in the previous chapters.
The difference between the ratios of bank credit interest 
paid by households to GDP in various countries − beyond the 
difference in credit-to-GDP ratios, i.e. in the volume effect 
− is attributable to several factors. First, varying interest 
burdens may depend on differences in general credit 
interest rate levels (interest rate effect) and the product 
type of loans drawn by households (composition effect). 
With the latter effect, interest rates on less risky loans, 
particularly mortgage loans and loans for house purchase, 
are generally lower in all countries and for all debtors than 
those of uncovered loans. Thus, if debtors in a country have 
unsecured loans at higher interest rates, the average 
interest burden will obviously be higher there as well.
As shown in Chart 9, the ratio of more risky non-housing 
loans in Hungary is higher within the stock of household 
loans than in most European countries (excluding Bulgaria 
and Romania), therefore, the composition effect also 
increases the interest burden in Hungary. In addition, a 
general difference in interest rates was also observed in 
2011: the nominal interest rate on housing loans is the 
second highest in Hungary behind Bulgaria,19 while Hungarian 
interest rates on non-housing loans are the highest within 
the entire European Union.20 The latter is somewhat 
surprising in view of the fact that home equity loans 
account for a high, 67 per cent percentage of non-housing 
loans in Hungary, which would, in principle, result in lower 
nominal interest in comparison to unsecured consumer 
loans. At the same time, the 15-30 per cent interest rates 
on unsecured (forint) loans in Hungary are also high.
Chart 8
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Chart 9
Distribution of housing and non-housing loans of 
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19  It is important to note that the composition effect may play a major role in determining the average national interest rates of non-housing loans, as 
in addition to home equity loans, these include consumer loans, credit card and overdraft facilities and motor vehicle loans, where interest rates − 
and credit risks − significantly vary.
20  See Annex for interest burden on non-housing household loans.
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In conclusion, the high interest burden of Hungarian 
households is attributable to both the composition effect 
and the generally higher interest rates. Differences in the 
latter across various countries may depend on several 
factors (a more detailed analysis of these goes beyond the 
scope of this work):
•  Denomination of loans: since the interest environment 
varies in different countries, depending on the general 
economic environment, this may also contribute to the 
difference in household credit interest rates (as reflected 
by the higher interest rate on Hungarian forint loans). The 
relevance of the interest rate level in Hungary is reduced 
to the extent that a larger portion of total household 
loans is denominated in foreign currency;
•  Availability and costs of bank funds, particularly in 
relation to the country risk premium: since the Hungarian 
country risk premium is among the highest in the 
European Union, and the country is heavily reliant on 
external funds, this factor clearly plays an important role 
in determining differences in customer interest rates;
•  Rate and volatility of inflation: nominal credit interest 
rates in the national currency are also higher in a high 
inflation environment, and we may observe that household 
customer interest rates are the highest in three EU 
countries, where inflation has been relatively high in 
recent years − Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary (see 
Annex, Chart xi). It is important to emphasise that 
although inflation may decrease the real value of the 
debtor’s credit in the long term (although this is not true 
in relation to loans with variable interest rates), this is in 
principle not the case in relation to FX loans, as the 
devaluation of the exchange rate caused by inflation 
differentials also increases the value of the credit 
denominated in the national currency. In other words, a 
high inflation environment does not reduce, but rather 
increases the (foreign exchange) debt problems of 
domestic households. (The application of inflation-
adjusted income statistics could serve as a possible 
method for filtering out the effect of inflation)21;
•  Other factors, sectoral competition,22 local legal 
environment, changes in non-performing loans: among 
these factors, the significantly higher ratio of non-
performing debtors/loans in Hungary compared to the EU 
average and the more difficult comparability of interest 
rates of household mortgage loans may play a role in 
higher customer interest rates.
Finally, it is possible, that due to the high Hungarian 
interest rate environment, Hungarian households realise 
higher interest income as a proportion of GDP on their 
deposits compared to the EU average, therefore, the net 
interest balance of households is not exceptionally high − 
even with higher expenditures on the credit side. Analysis 
of this assumption, however, is more difficult. This is 
because, first, a substantial portion of household financial 
income is not related to deposits within the banking sector, 
and we did not have available comparable data from other 
countries for the calculation of net interest income noted in 
the second chapter. Second, easily comparable international 
statistics are not available either on bank deposits.
We can, however, carry out a comparison between Hungary 
and the entire eurozone. As shown in Table 1, on the basis of 
data for the year 2011, bank interest income of Hungarian 
households as a proportion of GDP was indeed higher than in 
the eurozone, as only 20 per cent less household interest 
income was realised on approximately a third of bank deposit 
stock. In other words, a higher interest rate environment may 
produce a compensation effect on the interest payment 
volume of Hungarian households − higher than the EU 
average − on the debit/deposit side. We assume, however, 
that this can only moderately dampen the shock caused by 
declining net interest income resulting from indebtedness, 
owing to the heterogeneity of households (most borrowers 
are not savers). Moreover, this compensation effect was 
certainly unable to mitigate the adverse dynamics affecting 
the net interest income of Hungarian households since the 
crisis. As noted in the second chapter, interest income was 
insufficient to offset the rise in interest payable, thus the 
interest balance suffered a substantial deterioration.
21 But this statistics are available only for Hungary at the moment − international comparison is not possible.
22 For details see Corvoisier and Gropp (2002).
table 1
Ratio of interest on household bank deposits to GDP
eurozone Hungary
Bank deposits of households/GDP 62% 22%
Average (gross) deposit interest 
rate 1.6% 3.7%
Deposit interest income of 
households/GDP 1.0% 0.8%
Source: ECB, Eurostat, MNB.
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SuMMARy
Our analysis aimed at focusing attention on problems arising 
from the rapidly rising indebtedness of Hungarian households 
prior to 2008. As a natural consequence of the credit cycle, 
the direction of cash flows between households and the 
banking sector reversed after the credit expansion slowed 
down and stopped: debtors turned from net borrowers to 
net repayers. Net interest income of households also 
declined as a result of an increase in the (foreign exchange) 
credit stock up to 2008, and expanded further in response 
to the depreciation of the forint exchange rate: at a rate of 
over 1 per cent of GDP and over 2 per cent of disposable 
income compared to figures measured in 2006 and 2007. 
This obviously decreased household income and 
consumption. In addition, our estimates show that the 
volume of credit interest paid by Hungarian households as a 
proportion of GDP is one of the highest in the European 
Union, and indebtedness thus measured significantly 
exceeds the value shown through the credit stock-to-GDP 
ratio. This, however, may be partially offset by 
proportionately higher interest income earned on savings, 
attributable to the higher Hungarian interest rate 
environment, but this effect was presumably unable to 
offset the decline in net interest income. These data 
broaden somewhat the picture of the level of indebtedness 
− regarded earlier to be low − of Hungarian households.
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ANNeX
Chart i
Distribution of household mortgage loans based on loan-to-value (ltv) ratios; consumption and investment 
rate, and change in real wages of households
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Chart ii
out-of-sample estimates of the equilibrium level of 
Hungarian households’ bank debt to GDP 
(thin lines indicate equilibrium paths estimated with different country 
constants)
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Chart iii
Household cash flows vis-à-vis banks on the credit and debit sides relative to GDP 
(distribution of values in Charts 3 and 5 to GDP)
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Chart iv
Household cash flows vis-à-vis banks on the credit and debit sides, relative to disposable income of households 
(distribution of values in Charts 3 and 5 to disposable income)
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Chart v
Household cash flows vis-à-vis banks on the credit and debit sides relative to GDP 
(distribution of values in Chart 6 to GDP)
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Chart vi
Household cash flows vis-à-vis banks on the credit and debit sides relative to disposable income of households 
(distribution of values in Chart 6 to disposable income)
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Chart viii
Ratio of household bank loans to total household 
debt 
(2010)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
NL BE SK IR HU RO SL PT IT AT LV EE DE FI LT GR CZ ES FR BG PL MT
Households bank loans to total households debt
(2010)
Per cent Per cent
Source: Websites of ECB, MNB, Eurostat and various central banks.
Chart x
Ratio of loans and interest burdens of households to 
disposable income in 2008 and 2011
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Chart vii
Bank credit interest rates, financing costs, credit 
losses and margins of Swiss franc mortgage loans in 
Hungary
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Chart ix
Ratio of non-housing household loans and interest 
burdens on non-housing households to GDP 
(2011)
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Chart xii
Ratio of household deposits to total financial assets 
of households 
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Chart xi
Correlation between average annual interest rates  
on household home loans and the average rate of 
inflation
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